|
|
|
District Court Remands Claim to State Court, Finding No Federal Question Existed
(June 2011) By Lindsey N. Lanzendorfer, Summer Associate
For more information, contact Paul
Farquharson.
Daniels v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
Case No.: 09–1403, Civil Action No: 10-cv-01554, (United States District Court for the District of Columbia, June 10, 2011) |
View pdf
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia recently addressed whether a claim filed in State Court should be
removed to Federal Court. Plaintiff Randy Daniels originally filed his claim in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that his employer,
Defendant Potomac Electric Power Company (“PEPCO”), violated the District of
Columbia Human Rights Act, engaged in intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and negligently failed to provide Daniels with a safe work
environment. PEPCO filed a Notice of Removal to the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia based on federal question jurisdiction and Daniels
filed a Motion to Remand.
The U.S. District Court first explained that 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b) governs removal of cases to Federal Court. On a Motion to Remand a case
to State Court, the party opposing a Motion to Remand bears the burden of
showing that subject matter jurisdiction exists in Federal Court. Federal Courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over claims containing federal questions. A
federal question is present when the face of the plaintiff’s complaint reveals
that the claim arises under federal law or when federal law completely pre-empts
a claim.
Here, the District Court found that Daniels’ claim did
not arise under federal law because the claim was for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although Daniels claimed PEPCO
violated the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSHA”), OSHA does
not provide a private right of action so any violation of the act is mere
evidence of Daniels’ state law tort claims.
In addition, the Court found none of Daniels’ claims
were preempted by federal law. PEPCO cited Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), an Act that confers federal jurisdiction
over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements. PEPCO then
argued that because Daniels’ employment terms and conditions are governed by
the LMRA, that law pre-empts any state law causes of actions involving his
employment terms and conditions.
Contrary to PEPCO’s contentions, the Court found
Daniels’ claims were not pre-empted by LMRA. First, Daniels’ claims under
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) may implicate the
collective bargaining agreement between Daniels and PEPCO, but the claimed
rights arise from DCHRA, not the collective bargaining agreement. As such,
the State Court will not be interpreting or enforcing the collective
bargaining agreement. Second, Daniels’ claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress is not pre-empted by LMRA because the claim arises out of
alleged discriminatory conduct. Specifically, whether PEPCO breached the
collective bargaining agreement is not necessary to determine whether PEPCO
engaged in discriminatory conduct. Indeed, the alleged conduct— severe,
continued, and pervasive harassment— can be said to be clearly outside of
the employer’s rights without referencing the collective bargaining
agreement. Finding the claims alleged neither arose under federal law nor
were pre-empted by federal law, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia granted Daniels’ Motion to Remand the case to State
Court.
|
|
|
Top
