Stream of Commerce Contacts Cannot Alone Establish General Jurisdiction
(June 2011) By Lindsey M. Brunk, Summer Associate
For more information, contact Paul
Farquharson.
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, No. 10-76 (United States Supreme Court, June 27, 2011) | View pdf
In the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding
personal jurisdiction, there have only been two (2) cases where general
jurisdiction—as opposed to specific jurisdiction—was at issue. Recently, the
Court added one more case to that list, when it considered whether several
European subsidiaries of Goodyear Tires USA could be sued in North Carolina
under a general jurisdiction theory. The Court held that they could not.
In 2004, a bus carrying a young soccer team from North
Carolina crashed outside of Paris, France, and two 13-year-old boys died in the
accident. Their estates and families sued Goodyear’s foreign subsidiaries, the
manufacturers of the tires on the bus, alleging that it was their defective
product which caused the accident. These subsidiaries, the Petitioners, disputed
being hailed into court in North Carolina. The tires manufactured by these
companies differed in size and construction from the tires manufactured in
America, and they never advertised or sold their product in North Carolina.
However, a small percentage of their tires were distributed in America by other
Goodyear USA affiliates. Based on a stream of commerce theory, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals had held that the Petitioners were subject to general
personal jurisdiction in North Carolina.
The Supreme Court rejected this theory. In order for a
Court to assert general jurisdiction over a corporation, that corporation
must have connections with the State that are so “continuous and systematic”
as to make them at home in the forum state. See Int’l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). In Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), a Columbian corporation had
sent its chief executive officer to Texas for a meeting, had accepted checks
from Texas, had purchased equipment from Texas, and had trained some
employees in Texas, but it nevertheless failed to have such “continuous and
systematic” contacts as to render general jurisdiction appropriate in Texas.
The Petitioners had done markedly less to avail themselves to North
Carolina.
In reversing the North Carolina Courts’ exercise of
jurisdiction over the Petitioners, the Supreme Court criticized North
Carolina’s interpretation of the general personal jurisdiction doctrine as
“sprawling” and explained that under their holding, any seller of goods
could be amenable to suit anywhere that its products were distributed. Had
the Respondents suffered some injury within North Carolina due to one of the
Petitioner’s tires, then specific personal jurisdiction may have been
appropriate, but under the facts of the case, the Petitioners were not
subject to the Courts of North Carolina.
On a final note, the Court explained that one of the
Respondents’ arguments would not be considered because it was raised too
late. The Respondents argued for the first time in oral argument before the
Supreme Court that the Court should consider Goodyear USA and its foreign
subsidiaries a “single enterprise.” If Goodyear USA would be subject to
North Carolina’s jurisdiction, then so should the Petitioners, they argued.
However, because the issue was raised too late, it was not considered.