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Complaint Alleges Facts Sufficient to Find Company was Plaintiff’s Employer
(July 2011) By Lindsey N. Lanzendorfer, Summer Associate
For more information, contact Paul
Farquharson.
Hollensteiner v. Waterfield Group,
No: 10-cv-00200-AW (United States District Court for the District of Maryland, June 27, 2011) | View pdf
In this recent case, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland held that the Complaint alleged facts sufficient to
survive a Motion to Dismiss. In his Complaint, Plaintiff, Malcolm Hollensteiner,
contended that Defendant, Waterfield Group, effectively terminated his
employment—as a senior vice president of retail mortgage banking at Waterfield
Bank—but did not actually terminate him until it was no longer required to
provide a severance payment. Waterfield Group argued that Hollensteiner failed
to allege facts sufficient to establish the existence of an employment
relationship between the two parties. Instead, Waterfield Group alleged that
their subsidiary, Waterfield Bank, employed Hollensteiner.

When reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, a Court can only
consider documents that are part of the pleadings. If the parties present
matters outside the pleadings, the Court must treat the motion as one for
summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Additionally, to survive a Motion to
Dismiss, a plaintiff must provide enough detail to “nudge his claim across the
line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007).
In this case, the U.S. District Court found that the
four corners of the Complaint merely stated that Waterfield was
Hollensteiner’s employer. Without more, this bald assertion would fail to
establish an employment relationship. However, Hollensteiner provided the
court with additional documents to consider. Because neither party wanted to
turn the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment, the District
Court decided it would be more efficient to consider the documents and
permit Hollensteiner to amend the Complaint than to dismiss the case without
prejudice.
Moving to the merits of the case, the District Court
rejected Hollensteiner’s argument that the integrated-employer doctrine,
which allows a parent company to be liable for the actions of its
subsidiaries, applied. The Court found the theory was developed for federal
labor and civil rights cases and did not decide to extend it in this case.
Moreover, piercing the corporate veil did not apply as Maryland law only
permits the doctrine when the corporate form has been used by a shareholder
to perpetuate fraud. On his third try, the District Court found
Hollensteiner alleged enough facts to make it plausible that Waterfield
Group fit the definition of “employer” under the Maryland Wage Payment and
Collection Act. The Court reasoned that although Waterfield Group may not
have had the power to select and hire Hollensteiner, it provided
Hollensteiner with paychecks, permitted him to participate in a stock
options plan, and seem to have power over his termination and severance
payment. The Employment Agreement also suggested that the employment was
subject to policy guidelines of Waterfield Group. Finally, Hollensteiner
alleged that he collaborated closely with Waterfield Group’s Irvine,
California office. Accordingly, the District Court denied the Motion to
Dismiss and permitted the claim to proceed to discovery.
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