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Jury Instruction on Assumption of Risk is not Required in Federal Employer's Liability Act Case
(August, 2009) By Tamiya N. Wilkes, Associate.
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Collins v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., No. 2154 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. August 2009)
The wife of an electric traction lineman, employed by
National Railroad Passenger Corp. ("Amtrak"), filed suit after her husband ("the
Decedent") died as a result of severe burns he received from an energized power
line while working for Amtrak.
Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Amtrak pursuant
to the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51, et seq., which
permits railroad workers to recover for injuries caused by the negligence of
their employers or fellow employees. The doctrine of assumption of the risk is
barred as a defense to FELA claims.
The matter proceeded to trial, which resulted in a verdict
in favor of Amtrak. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial court abused its
discretion in not instructing the jury that assumption of risk is not a defense
to a claim arising under the FELA.
Plaintiff argued that a jury instruction on assumption of
risk was necessary because Amtrak implicated the doctrine by inadvertently
asserting that the Decedent had assumed the risk of his injuries. Specifically,
Plaintiff claimed that Amtrak relied heavily upon the argument that its Right of
Refusal policy permitted the Decedent to decline to perform the work that
resulted in his severe burns, if he thought such work was dangerous, and that
the Decedent chose not to exercise that right. Plaintiff argued that Amtrak's
reliance on the Decedent's failure to exercise his right of refusal, could have
been interpreted as a voluntary, knowledgeable, acceptance of a dangerous
condition, in other words that the Decedent assumed the risk. Plaintiff also
argued that a jury instruction on assumption of the risk was necessary because
Amtrak presented evidence from which the jury could have concluded that the
Decedent's actions were the sole cause of his injuries and he thereby assumed
the risk of his injuries.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, in disagreeing
with Plaintiff's arguments, stated that Amtrak's reference to its Right of
Refusal policy was not for the purpose of arguing that the Decedent had the
right to refuse to do work that he thought was dangerous, but rather to show
that the Decedent had a safer alternative to doing his job in the manner that
caused his injuries. As to the issue of whether the evidence presented by Amtrak
could have led the jury to conclude that the Decedent's actions were the sole
cause of his injuries, the Court stated that the evidence tended to show that
the Decedent departed from the standard of care and acted unreasonably under the
circumstances, which implicated the defense of contributory negligence and not
assumption of the risk.
The Court held that the doctrine of assumption of the risk
was not implicated by the evidence elicited at trial.
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