Debtor, James P. Quillen, Jr. ("Quillen"), proceeding pro se, filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court of the District of Maryland pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Quillen owned, managed and was developing a number of real estate projects through entities that he solely owned and controlled. However, Quillen indicated on his Statement of Financial Affairs, filed with the Bankruptcy Court, that the value of his interests in his personal property was "unknown." The case was subsequently converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7.

Quillen then filed an Amended Exemptions Schedule pursuant to §522(l) of the Bankruptcy Code, attempting to exempt all of the property that he brought with him into bankruptcy, including certain real and personal property he owned with his wife, Karen Quillen, as tenants by the entirety. Quillen assigned an exemption value of $11,000 to the property he individually owned; he assigned a gross exemption of $2,581,000 to the property he and his wife owned as tenants by the entirety.

Zvi Guttman ("Guttman") was assigned as Trustee of Quillen's Chapter 7 bankruptcy. As Trustee, Guttman filed an Objection to Appellant's Amended Exemptions Schedule, however Guttman's objection was untimely. In response to the untimely objection, Quillen filed a large number of motions, which were considered by the Bankruptcy Court. In its Order, the Bankruptcy Court: 1) sua sponte consolidated claims against the Quillens into a new adversary proceeding where both Quillen and his wife were named as defendants; 2) held that the property the Quillens own as tenants by the entirety could be administered by a trustee because claims of joint creditors were filed against them; and 3) found that Quillen would only be permitted to exempt $11,000 of the property he owned individually because that was the total exemption value he claimed for his personal property in his Amended Exemptions Schedule. Quillen appealed the Bankruptcy Court's Order to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ("the Court').

In his appeal, Quillen argued that the Bankruptcy Court erred in: 1) consolidating a contested matter with a related adversary proceeding, 2) ruling that the Quillens' property may be administered by a trustee, and 3) finding that Appellant's exemption of personal property is limited to the $11,000 value he assigned it in his Amended Exemptions Schedule.

The Court in affirming the rulings of the Bankruptcy Court, held that consolidation was proper pursuant to FED. R. BANK. P. 7042, which incorporates Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and states: if actions before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the court may: (1) join for hearing or trial any or all matters at issue in the actions; (2) consolidate the actions; or (3) issue any other orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay. The Court found the Quillen's case was clearly consolidated with related proceedings that share a question central to the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case: Whether a trustee in bankruptcy may administer a property held by tenants in the entireties when only one spouse has filed for bankruptcy and there are joint unsecured creditors.

The Court also held that the Bankruptcy Court correctly held that a trustee may administer the Quillens' joint property for the benefit of creditors with claims against both of them. Although under Maryland law, property held as tenants by the entirety, may not be taken to satisfy individual debts of either spouse. Diamond v. Diamond, 467 A.2d 510, 513 (1983), a Chapter 7 trustee may administer entireties property for the benefit of creditors holding joint claims against husband and wife. Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985); Williams v. Peyton (In re Williams), 104 F.3d 688 (4th Cir. 1997).

Lastly, the Court held that the Quillen's exemptions were appropriately limited. In his Amended Exemptions Schedule, Quillen listed the value of his claimed exemption for his personal property as $11,000; therefore, the Court held, that Quillen's exemption is limited to the value that the placed on the property. The Court found that a debtor's exemption is limited to the value that the debtor assigns to the interest that the debtor is claiming as exempt. In re Forti, 224 B.R. 323, 327 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998); Addison v. Reavis, 158 B.R. 53, 61 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 32 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 1994).