The Plaintiff’s Awarded Attorneys’ Fees Under the Clean Air Act Where Victory
was Merely Procedural
(April 2011) By Gregory L. Arbogast, Associate
For more information, contact Paul
Farquharson.
S. Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC,
No. 08-2370 (4th Cir. April 14, 2011)
In Southern Alliance for Clean Energy v. Duke Energy
Carolinas, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
upheld the District Court’s award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs under the
Clean Air Act. The Court of Appeals found that Plaintiffs were successful on the
merits of the case, despite the District Court abstaining from the case and
ordering Defendants to submit to a state administrative hearing.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC arises out of a lawsuit
under the Clean Air Act in which Plaintiffs, Southern Alliance for Clean Energy,
Environmental Defense Fund, National Parks Conservation Association, Natural
Resources Defense Counsel, and the Sierra Club (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
sought to enjoin Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (“Duke Energy”) from constructing a
new coal-burning power plant that had not undergone the “maximum achievable
controlled technology” assessment by the North Carolina Department of
Environment, as required by the Clean Air Act.
In 2005, Defendant Duke Energy applied to the North
Carolina Utilities Commission for a certificate to build a new 800 megawatt
coal power plant and, in March 2007, the North Carolina Utilities Commission
granted that request. Defendant Duke Energy then applied to North Carolina
Division of Air Quality for a construction permit to build the plant. On
January 29, 2008, the Division of Air Quality granted Duke Energy’s
application and Duke Energy promptly began construction on the power plant.
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint, which sought to enjoin
Duke Energy from the construction of the power plant until it underwent the
maximum achievable controlled technology assessment and which sought civil
penalties against Duke Energy. Duke Energy filed a Motion to Dismiss, which
asserted that the Clean Air Act did not govern Duke Energy’s construction
permit application, and Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The
District Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and granted Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing the case and ordering Defendant Duke
Energy to appear before the North Carolina Department of the Environment to
assess whether Duke Energy was using the maximum achievable control
technology to mitigate its emissions. Then, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Attorney’s Fees, and the District Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion.
Defendant Duke Energy appealed the award of attorney’s
fees, and argued that Plaintiffs merely had a procedural victory, not a
substantive victory. The Clean Air Act authorizes an award of attorney’s
fees “whenever the Court determines such an award is appropriate.” The
Supreme Court has stated, however, that the Clean Air Act does not grant
unlimited discretion to the trial judge in awarding attorney’s fees.
Instead, attorney’s fees are only to be awarded in cases where the claimant
has prevailed on the merits. The Supreme Court has also determined that,
where a plaintiff forces an administrative agency to perform an act required
by law, the plaintiff has succeeded on the merits. Therefore, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that the Plaintiffs, in
the instant, case were successful in forcing the North Carolina Department
of the Environment to perform a statutorily required assessment and affirmed
the award of attorney’s fees.