The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the Plaintiffs' Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit applied the standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint articulated by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and stated again in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

Twombly requires that the facts alleged in a complaint must articulate a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." The Fourth Circuit determined that even accepting the Plaintiffs' allegations as true, they had failed to state a claim that could plausibly entitle them to relief. The Court noted that the Supreme Court's "plausible on its face" standard arose from the recent increase in "strike suits" and the high costs related to frivolous litigation. The Court noted that this approach recognizes that "naked assertions" of wrongdoing necessitate some "factual enhancement" within the complaint in order to cross the line between possibility and plausibility. The Court then briefly performed an analysis on each count of the Complaint to illustrate why Plaintiffs had not met the plausibility threshold.

Count One contained allegations that the Mayor's use of other Baltimore City police officers to "seize property in the Commissioner's office" as well as requiring all three officers to surrender their weapons, badges and identification cards was in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court noted the important distinction that the Baltimore City police officers involved were not performing a law enforcement activity at the time of the seizure, but rather were acting in furtherance of the Mayor's decision to terminate Plaintiffs' employment. In an administrative situation (as opposed to law enforcement) the Supreme Court has approved a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee's reasonable expectation of privacy. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). This balancing test does not implicate either probable cause or a warrant requirement which are both related to the police's law enforcement function.

Count Two alleged racial discrimination in the terminations due to Commissioner Clark and Deputy Francis being African-American. However, as Deputy Romano was white and not within the alleged protected class; yet, also terminated at the same time and for the same reasoning, the Court affirmed the dismissal of this claim out of hand. The Court stated, "The allegations in this count are nothing more than the sort of unadorned allegations of wrongdoing to which Twombly and Iqbal are directed."

Count Three alleged that Mayor O'Malley and the City Solicitor deprived the Plaintiffs of their Fourth Amendment rights to protected property interests without due process. The Court affirmed that Mayor O'Malley was entitled to qualified immunity in this matter. "Qualified immunity applies when the Constitutional right alleged to have been violated is not ‘clearly established.'" Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). The Court then noted that pursuant to the memorandum of understanding which governed Commissioner Clark's employment with the city; he could be terminated without cause. Therefore, Commissioner Clark did not have a "clearly established" property right to his job.

Lastly, the Plaintiffs' claimed a conspiracy to violate their civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. ' 1985. Again applying the Twombly standard, the Court stated: "To plead a violation of ' 1985, Plaintiffs must demonstrate specific facts that the Defendants were motivated by a specific class-based invidiously discriminatory animus to deprive the Plaintiffs of equal enjoyment of rights." The Court noted that the allegations in Count Four were no more than legal conclusions which, on their face, failed to assert a plausible claim.