|
|
|
Building on Construction Litigation Procedure
(July 2009) By Gregory L. Arbogast, Summer Associate.
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Montgomery County v. Longo, No. 1075 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. July
7, 2009)
This case reviews and sets administrative procedures for
building permit violations in construction cases. In Montgomery County v. Longo,
the Court of Special Appeals established that the Board of Appeals of Montgomery
County had the authority to hear an appeal from the Department of Permitting
Services' ("DPS") decision to lift a stop work order. Montgomery County Code §
8-23 (2002) provides that, "Any person aggrieved by the issuance, denial,
renewal, or revocation of a permit or any other decision or order of [DPS]...may
appeal to the County Board of Appeals." The Court of Special Appeals held that a
decision to lift a stop work order falls within the, "any other order" provision
of § 8-23.
Montgomery County v. Longo revolves around a dispute over a
home renovation. Ms. Longo owned a home in Montgomery County, but she wanted a
larger house on that same property. As a result, she obtained a building permit
to build an "addition." That permit allowed her to build a home that did not
exceed the original footprint by 100 percent and retained 50 percent of the
existing exterior walls. Ms. Longo retained two of the four walls of the
original home, but she significantly changed them by removing a chimney and
garage doors. Her neighbor, Ms. Carol Placek filed a complaint with the DPS for
a violation of the building permit. DPS issued a stop work order. DPS met with
Ms. Longo and she was able to convince DPS that her renovations did not violate
her building permit. DPS permitted her to resume construction. Ms. Placek
appealed that decision to the County Board of Appeals, which reinstated the stop
work order. Ms. Longo appealed that decision to the Circuit Court, which held
that the Board of Appeals did not have authority to hear this case because it
found that repealing a stop work order was not appealable under § 8-23. Ms.
Placek then appealed the Circuit Court's decision to the Court of Special
Appeals.
The Board of Appeals, the Circuit Court and the Court of
Special Appeals all relied on the case Nat'l Inst. of Health Fed. Credit Union
v. Hawk, which appeared to be one of the few instructive cases on appellate
review of building permits. 47 Md. App. 189 (1980). In Hawk, the County
interpreted a building permit months after it issued that permit and after the
time to appeal the issuance of the permit expired. Id. at 192. Several area
residents appealed the County's interpretation of that permit. Id. at 195.
However, the court held that the interpretation was an extension of the issuance
of the permit. Id. The court found that the interpretation did not fall under
the "any other order" portion of § 8-23 because it was really part of the
"issuance" portion of that clause. Id. Since the time to appeal the issuance had
already expired, the Board of Appeals could not hear the appeal. Id.
In Longo, the Court of Special Appeals found that lifting a
stop work order was not an extension of the issuance of the original permit and,
therefore, Hawk was not controlling. The court found that a stop work order is
issued and lifted under a material change of circumstances not contemplated at
the time the permit is issued. Therefore, it is a separate and distinct order of
DPS and it is appealable under § 8-23.
|
|
|