The Plaintiffs, members of Plasterers' Local Union No. 26
Pension Plan, sued several of their fiduciaries for allegedly violating ERISA
and breaching their duty to review prudently the Union's investment strategy.
Various Defendants and claims were dismissed throughout the litigation.
Ultimately, only the claims against three fiduciaries proceeded to a bench
trial. The District Court dismissed one fiduciary from the case, but found the
other two fiduciaries had breached their trustee duties by failing to inquire
reasonably into alternative investment strategies for seven years. After the
Court awarded $432,986.70 in damages, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
Attorneys' Fees and Expenses pursuant to section 502(g)(1) of ERISA. See 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
By way of background, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has held, in Wheeler v. Dynamic Engineering, Inc., 62 F.3d 634 at 641,
that the district court has full discretion when awarding attorneys' fees.
Another Fourth Circuit case, Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d
1017 at 1029, establishes the discretionary guidelines the District Court used
to consider the appropriateness of the award: 1) the degree of Defendants'
culpability, 2) the Defendants' ability to pay, 3) whether the Plaintiffs'
request for attorneys' fees benefited all retirement plan participants, and 4)
the merits of both parties' positions.
The District Court first found that the extent of gross
indifference and total neglect of the Defendants' duties were sufficient bases
to justify an award of attorneys' fees. Second, Defendants' insurance company
could pay the award of attorneys' fees. Third, the Plaintiffs' only purpose in
pursuing litigation was to protect pension plan participants from Defendants'
conduct. Lastly, the Court considered the merits of Plaintiffs' and Defendants'
positions regarding the reasonableness of a fee amount.
While the Court found that the rates Plaintiffs' counsel
charged were reasonable, it determined that Plaintiffs' requested award was not
proportional to the successful claim. Additionally, Judge Messitte noted that
Plaintiffs' records did not reflect time specifically billed to particular
defendants, claims, or issues. Because the Plaintiffs' bills did not specify
what time was spent preparing the case against any of the three Defendants, and
because only the claims against two of the Defendants prevailed, the Court
reduced the Plaintiffs' requested amount by one-third. Such a reduction, the
Court reasoned, would render the amount awarded proportional to the success
achieved at trial. The Court further ordered a ten percent reduction since the
bills suggested duplicative charges, and the lack of detail in the bills
rendered the Court unable to determine if the duplicative billing was redundant
or unnecessary.
Lastly, the Court distinguished between the "hard" and
"soft" expenses Plaintiffs requested as part of their fee award. ERISA's
statutory award for attorney expenses includes "hard" expenses such as expert
and filing fees, as well as deposition costs. Yet, the Court found that the
"soft" expenses of online research, photocopies, and transportation costs were
more akin to the costs of a business that provides services and less akin to the
court costs reimbursed under ERISA. Thus, the Court refused to include any
"soft" expenses in its award. After these reductions and omissions, the Court
ultimately awarded $337,935.01 in fees and $20,014.47 in expenses, thereby
granting in part and denying in part Plaintiffs' motion.