James M. Darby ("Darby"), a 41 year-old carpenter, sustained
an injury on December 5, 2005 during the course of his employment with Marley
Cooling Tower Company ("Marley"). Mr. Darby was struck on the head by an
aluminum board used as a temporary work surface which was dropped by a
co-worker. Mr. Darby sought medical attention at Concentra Medical Center and
Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical Facilities.
Mr. Darby filed a claim with the Commission on December 22,
2005 seeking temporary total disability from December 6, 2005 and thereafter.
The Commission ruled that:
The disability of the Claimant is the result of the
accidental injury. The Commission denies the claim for temporary total
disability from December 6, 2005 to date and continuing. The Commission further
finds that the employer and insurer shall pay causally related medical expenses
in accordance with the Medical Fee Guide of this Commission.
Marley appealed the Order and elected a jury trial. Marley
contended that the Commission erroneously found the Claimant sustained an
accidental injury arising out of employment. Marley's concern was that it would
be liable for future medical expenses. Pursuant to MD. RULE 7-204(a), Darby
filed his intent to participate in the appeal.
Before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County could hear the
appeal, the parties agreed to a lump sum settlement. Darby died on August 3,
2007, from unrelated causes, before he was able to sign the Settlement
Agreement. This meant that the Commission did not have an opportunity to approve
the settlement. Without the Commission's approval, the Circuit Court could not
enforce the settlement. See Altman v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 52 Md. App. 564
(1982). Darby's death rendered Marley's concern over liability for future
medical expenses moot. Accordingly, Marley moved for a voluntary dismissal of
its appeal without prejudice, which was granted.
Within ten days, Darby moved for reconsideration and
requested a hearing on his motion. The Court, by The Honorable Judge Souder,
denied the motion.
Darby timely noted this appeal with the Court of Special
Appeals for that Order. The issue for the appellate court's consideration was
whether the Circuit Court erred in dismissing the appeal without Mr. Darby's
consent when Mr. Darby had an absolute right to have his issues heard without
the necessity of filing a cross-appeal.
Darby emphasized that the appeal from the Commission is de
novo. As such, Darby argued that they are free to introduce evidence additional
to that which was produced before the Commissioner. He argues that further,
because of the de novo appeal, he has an absolute right to have his issues heard
in the Circuit Court without the necessity of filing a cross-appeal.
On the other hand, Marley relied on MD. RULE 7-203(b). This
will provide:
"If one party files a timely petition [for appeal], any
other person may file a petition within ten days after the date the agency
mailed notice of the filing of the first petition, or within the period set
forth in subsection (a), whichever is later."
Under this Rule, Darby was required to file a cross-appeal
in order to obtain reversal of the Commission's decision on grounds separate and
apart from those which Marley took issue. Here, Marley appealed the Commission's
Order on the grounds that it determined Darby's injuries were arose out of
employment. Darby would need to file a cross-appeal to obtain reversal of the
Commission's Order denying temporary total disability benefits. In other words,
Marley argued that because the continued viability of Darby's claim for
disability benefits rested only on Marley's initial appeal to the Circuit Court
for Baltimore County, Darby's claim is now extinguished because Marley has
voluntarily dismissed his appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals held for Marley. For the Court
to adopt Darby's position, that his right to the appeal was secured by the de
novo hearing, there would be no need for the cross-appeal provision provided by
MD. RULE 7-203(b). Essentially Darby's position provides that an appeal from a
Commission's Order requires some type of "omnibus review" of the entire order
for all issues. The Court disagrees with this position and holds that a de novo
appeal does not secure that type of complete review of all issues contained with
the Workers' Compensation Commission order. That position would render all
cross-appeals moot.
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County in its dismissal of Darby's Motion to
Reconsider Marley's voluntary dismissal of its appeal from the Commission's
Order.
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