Trial court errs in excluding defense expert’s testimony that cigarette smoking contributed 75% to his lung cancer while occupational exposure to asbestos contributed 25% to his lung cancer, and from preventing defendant from adding question regarding same from jury verdict sheet.

Plaintiffs established their prima facie case of race and age discrimination, but the employer produced evidence of a legitimate reason for its employment decisions. The burden shifted back to Plaintiffs to prove that the City’s reason was pretextual and that its decisions were premised upon unlawful discrimination. The court found nothing to support Plaintiffs’ allegations.

Plaintiff attempted to extend the limitations period on her tort claim by filing her action and then failing to serve Defendant for a nearly two-year period. The Court could not allow this type of delay, and dismissed her Complaint.

Relying upon Wilhelm v. State Traffic Safety Comm’n, 185 A.2d 715, 719 (Md. 1962), the Fourth Circuit vacated the Maryland district court’s for Defendants in personal injury case where there was no complicated medical question for which expert testimony was necessary to prove causation.

Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded wrongful death and survivorship case where a proper forum non conveniens inquiry, applying the heightened deference owed to a citizen-plaintiff seeking suit in her home forum, did not establish “such oppressiveness and vexation to Defendant as to be out of all proportion to Plaintiff’s convenience.”

Court of Appeals affirms reversal of grant of Summary Judgment in favor of private commercial ambulance company in medical malpractice case where Good Samaritan Act is not applicable, and there was a lack of evidence in this particular case that the Fire and Rescue Act applied.

In Housing Authority of Baltimore City v. Carter, the Court of Special Appeals held that it was abuse of the trial court’s discretion to allow a medical doctor to opine as to the source of lead without any direct evidence that lead was in the property.

In Genesis Healthcare Corp., et al. v. Laura Symczyk, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s opinion regarding “pick-offs” in regard to a collective action filed pursuant to the FLSA.

Plaintiff, Putt-Putt, LLC, sued 416 Constant Friendship, LLC for seeking to register the mark “PUTT-PUTT FUN CENTER.” Plaintiff claimed that it owned a valid and protectable mark, and that Defendant’s use of that mark created a likelihood of confusion. The court agreed.

Applying provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to Maryland law, the Fourth Circuit determined that the actions of hospital staff, which exacerbated a patient’s injuries at a physical therapy facility, were reasonably foreseeable and not “extraordinarily negligent” such that the hospital and the physical therapy facility should not be considered joint tortfeasors.

Applying North Carolina contract law, the Fourth Circuit determined that the defense of “mutual mistake” was not warranted where an Asset Purchase Agreement embodied the parties’ actual, original, fully-negotiated intent, and where mutual mistake was a tactic to obtain a better bargain than the one the parties initially negotiated.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated its May 15, 2011, decision in McCravy v. Metro. Life Insurance Co., on the basis of CIGNA Corp. v. AMARA, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011), and broadens equitable remedies available to ERISA claimants in breach of fiduciary duty cases.

In Jones v. Graziano, et al., Judge Bredar dismissed Plaintiff’s suit finding that he failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Section 8 of the housing Act, even accepting his factual allegations as true.

Although sellers of a home violated the mandatory mediation provision of the sale contract, after the unsuccessful participation of the parties in a settlement conference with a magistrate judge, a stay in the district court proceedings pending further mediation became futile.

In Brandford v. Shannon-Baum Signs, Inc., the Fourth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court’s dismissal, which was effectively a grant of summary judgment on claims of discrimination and retaliation.

In McCauley v. Home Loan Investment Bank, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Federal statute did not entirely preempt Plaintiff’s claims against mortgage lender, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirms District Court’s dismissal of Complaint arising from bank’s mortgage modification denial and in state common law related to alleged violations of the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 et seq.

Court of Special Appeals reverses trial court grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants where their pool did not comply with COMAR and Montgomery County Code regulations; regulatory violations were evidence of negligence.

Plaintiff’s lead poisoning expert was unqualified and lacked factual basis to testify about, inter alia, source of exposure. But see, Ross v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City (issued on same day by Maryland Court of Appeals, holding that source of lead exposure may be proven by circumstantial evidence, without the need for expert).

Defendants removed to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on the asserted basis of federal preemption under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The court held that Plaintiffs' claims were not preempted by § 301. Consequently, the case was remanded.

In asbestos litigation, Maryland district court found that federal officer removal statute applied to private government contractor that was “acting under” the supervision of the United States Navy and the Coast Guard.

In case involving allegedly defective pacemaker causing the death of a three-year old, Maryland district court found that negligent misrepresentation and breach of express warranty claims were preempted under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) and Riegel v. Medtronic where “parallel” violations were alleged but not sufficiently identified in the complaint.

In Okoli v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court’s partial grant of a motion for judgment that resulted in reducing jury award to nominal damage.

Plaintiffs sued the Baltimore City Police Commissioner and two officers for, inter alia, state law and RICO claims. The court held that Plaintiffs did not comply with the Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act because sending notice to the State Treasurer and filing an internal affairs complaint was insufficient, and because they did not establish good cause.

Commercial landlord breached implied-in-fact contract with real estate broker when it failed to pay broker 3% commission on long-term lease where: 1) landlord had reason to know that broker’s services were for landlord’s benefit and not some other person; 2) landlord was on notice that broker’s services were not gratuitous; and, 3) the broker’s services were beneficial to the landlord.

Where a plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against the government was based upon negligence—not misrepresentation or slander—that claim was not barred by sovereign immunity contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).

In Raymond James v. Cary, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision that relationship between investors and Financial Services Company was too attenuated for those investors to be considered customers.

Defense counsel provided notice of filing of removal papers to Plaintiff’s counsel prior to the filing of the notice in State court. This allowed Plaintiffs time to file an amended complaint in State court, prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s removal papers. Therefore, the operative pleading was the amended complaint, which did not contains grounds for removal.

Plaintiffs failed to prove fraud as they did not detrimentally rely on fraudulent statements Exxon allegedly made to the government in connection with gas leak. While Maryland recognizes tort damages for emotional distress for fear of developing latent disease, and for costs of medical monitoring, the Plaintiffs failed to prove the elements of these claims.