Prior Delivered Deed of Trust Takes Priority Over Subsequent Judgment
(January 2009) By Tamiya N. Wilkes, Associate.
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Mary B.,
No.: 2219 (Md. January 4, 2010)
Charles Lee Petr ("Mr. Petr") owns a house in Baltimore
County, Maryland ("the Property"). Mr. Petr was convicted of second-degree rape
of his fourteen-year old niece, Mary B.; Mr. Petr is currently serving a 20-year
prison sentence for his rape conviction.
Following the rape conviction, Mary B. filed a civil lawsuit
against Mr. Petr, alleging battery. On May 11, 2007, Mary B. obtained a judgment
against Mr. Petr in the amount of $2,000,000. Mary B. subsequently obtained a
writ of execution and the Sheriff levied on the Property by posting notice that
the Property was to be sold. The Sheriff’s Sale was advertised and scheduled for
October 25, 2007.
One week before the sale, Chicago Title Insurance Company,
for its own use and for the use of Aegis Funding Corporation ("the Title Co."),
filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County ("the Court"), against both
Mary B. and Mr. Petr. The Title Co. sought to enjoin the Sheriff’s Sale and to
obtain a judgment declaring that its lien against the Property took priority
over Mary B.’s judgment. The Title Co. alleged that it held a deed of trust
against the property securing a loan for $150,000 made to Mr. Petr. The deed of
trust for the loan had been signed on July 15, 2005; however, it was not
recorded in the Land Records of Baltimore County ("Land Records"), as required
by Maryland law, until two years later on October 9, 2007, after the Sheriff’s
Sale was advertised.
Mary B. filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that she
had brought the civil lawsuit against Mr. Petr after examining the Land Records
and determining that there was no debt owed against the Property. The Court
granted Mary B.'s Motion for Summary Judgment finding that based on the
undisputed material facts, Mary B.'s judgment took priority over the Title Co.'s
deed of trust. The Title Co. appealed the Court's judgment, arguing that the
Court erred in granting summary judgment for Mary B.
Pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Real Prop. § 3-201 ("the
statute"), [t]he effective date of a deed is the date of delivery, and the date
of delivery is presumed to be the date of the last acknowledgment, if any, or
the date stated on the deed, whichever is later. Every deed, when recorded,
takes effect from its effective date as against the grantor, his personal
representatives, every purchaser with notice of the deed, and every creditor of
the grantor with or without notice.
Although the deed of trust was not recorded until October 9,
2007, the Title Company argued that the plain language of the statute means that
the deed of trust was effective on July 15, 2005, the date it was signed.
Therefore, according to the Title Co., the deed of trust takes priority over
Mary B.'s judgment. Mary B. argued that a judgment creditor who has become a
lienholder against the Property, takes priority over the holder of an unrecorded
deed of trust against the Property, even if the deed that was signed before the
judgment was entered.
The Court of Special Appeals agreed with the Title Co. and
held that a recorded deed of trust is effective against any creditor of the
person who granted the deed of trust as of the date of delivery of the deed of
trust, not the date recorded. The Court of Special Appeals further held that
Mary B. was a creditor within the meaning of the statute, the statute did not
distinguish between the various types of creditors; therefore, the deed of trust
was effective against her regardless of whether she knew of it.