Employees Get Paid Under FLSA when Employer Mistakenly Classifies them as Exempt
(January 2011) By Colleen K. O'Brien
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming,
No. 09-2189 (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jan. 14, 2011) |
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Former employees of Charles Town Gaming initiated a lawsuit
against their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for unpaid
overtime compensation. The lawsuit arose because the employer erroneously
categorized the employees as exempt under the FLSA, and paid them salaries
rather than a per diem wage. Consequently, the employees, who often worked more
than 40 hours per week, were never paid the overtime compensation to which they
were allegedly entitled.
On appeal, the employees disputed the calculation method of
the unpaid overtime compensation under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the employer
disputed the District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment on the issue of
willful violation. The appellate court affirmed the calculation of the unpaid
overtime wages, but vacated the District Court’s decision on the issue of
wilfullness.
The employees argued that the unpaid overtime wages
should have been paid at a 150 percent premium of the regular weekly rate,
and the employer argued that a 50 percent premium applied. The District
Court agreed with the employer, and relied on
Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, 315 U.S. 572 (1942), to
rule that the employees should be compensated at a 50 percent premium of the
regular weekly rate. In so holding, the Court aligned itself with the First,
Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits who all have determined that the 50
percent overtime premium applies.
The second issue was whether the employer willfully
violated the FLSA. Whether the violation was willful affects the statute of
limitations (if the violation is willful, the three year statute of
limitations applies, but if the violation is not willful, the two year
statute of limitations applies). An employer willfully violates the FLSA if
it either “knows” or shows “reckless disregard” for its conduct vis-à-vis
FLSA compliance.
The District Court found that the employer’s violation
of the FLSA was willful as a matter of law, but the appellate court
disagreed. When the appellate court viewed all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party, who here was the employer, there was
a genuine issue of material fact regarding willful conduct. The evidence
showed that the FLSA designation was a typographical error, which indicated
mere negligence. The Court could not find that, as a matter of law, the
employer acted willfully. As a result, the case was affirmed in part, and
vacated and remanded in part.