In 2006, Figueroa replied to the IRS's internal job posting for the position of Lead IT Specialist; a promotion from his current role as an IT Specialist. Figueroa had worked at the IRS since 1994 in the role of IT Specialist, and had consistently earned excellent job performance evaluations. During the interview process, a panel of interviewers assigned Figueroa and the other candidates a numerical score. Figueroa scored a 46.6, and was edged out only by the ultimate hire, Mr. Harris, who scored a 47.6. The ranking panel considered both Figueroa and Mr. Harris "substantially" more qualified than any of the other internal candidates. However, Ms. Rosh, who led the selection process, recommended hiring only Mr. Harris, even though there were two vacancies for the role. After the internal interview process, the IRS opened an external selection process to fill the second vacancy, and ultimately hired an external candidate.

Figueroa filed suit under Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794. To assess Figueroa's claim, the Court embarked on a burden-shifting scheme, modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq., and announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To survive summary judgment, Figueroa was required to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. Figueroa's prima facie case was uncontested, the burden then shifted to the IRS to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment decision. The IRS met this burden by presenting testimony that Figueroa was denied the promotion based on job performance and relative employee qualifications.

Next, the burden shifted back to Figueroa to raise a genuine issue as to whether the IRS's legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were a pretext for unlawful discrimination. To establish a pretext, plaintiffs must present evidence that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were unworthy of credence and that unlawful discrimination was the actual motive for the decision. The court had "little trouble" concluding that Figueroa's evidence was sufficient and that a reasonable juror could conclude that all of the IRS's proffered reasons were either factually false, or were not motivating factors in the selection process. Figueroa at *15. The falsity of the IRS's proffered reasons, coupled with the evidence from Figueroa's prima facie case, supported a finding of a discriminatory motive: "Ms. Rosh recommended Mr. Harris (non-disabled) over a blind applicant for one of two identical vacancies, Ms. Rosh refused to recommend the blind applicant for the other vacancy, and the blind applicant's nonselection resulted in keeping the position open for months." Id. at *18. The court continued that "[n]ot only was a qualified disabled applicant passed over in favor of a non-disabled applicant, but the disabled applicant had a nearly identical application score to that of the non-disabled applicant." Id.

Ultimately, the Court held that because there was substantial evidence that the IRS's proffered reasons were unworthy of credence, and the facts establishing Figueroa's prima facie case were particularly probative of discriminatory intent, the determination of whether unlawful discrimination occurred was one properly left to the finder of fact at trial.