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Prison Wins On Discrimination Claims By Correctional Officer

Veronica Taylor v. Patuxent Institution, No. CCB-09-1111 (D. Md., Nov. 30, 2009)

Plaintiff, Veronica Taylor ("Ms. Taylor"), alleged unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, race, retaliation, and constructive discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") against her employer, Patuxent Institution ("Patuxent"). She also alleged that she was denied due process of law when Patuxent demoted her. Patuxent filed a Motion to Dismiss, and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted it.

Ms. Taylor was a Correctional Officer Captain at Patuxent Institution in Jessup, Maryland until she resigned in September 2008. She had been employed at Patuxent for eighteen years but resigned rather than accept demotion from the rank of Captain to Lieutenant. A particular event ("the incident") led to her demotion. The incident occurred on August 22, 2008. Specifically, Ms. Taylor left Patuxent to bring back two birthday cakes and was demoted on the grounds that she left the prison without clocking-out and brought two cakes into the prison without proper authorization.

The incident was not the only complaint against Ms. Taylor. She was also accused of favoritism and had a complaint filed against her by a subordinate. Additionally, in the two years preceding her demotion, she had three complaints filed against her for "various infractions."

Ms. Taylor did not appeal her demotion and was allegedly barred from employment from all correctional facilities in Maryland. Therefore, she filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging: (1) unlawful discrimination because she is African American and a woman; (2) unlawful retaliation for her filing a grievance with the Office of Administrative Hearings; (3) constructive discharge because of two years of "continuous harassment"; and (4) violations of her due process rights.

A. Title VII Claims

A plaintiff may establish discrimination by two means. First, through direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination motivated an employer’s adverse employment action. Second, if there is no direct evidence of discrimination, under a pretext framework to raise an inference of discrimination as set forth by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Ms. Taylor’s Complaint did not include allegations of direct discrimination; therefore, it was analyzed under the pretext framework.

1. Discrimination

To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination where a demotion has occurred, a Plaintiff must show that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was discharged or demoted; (3) at the time of her discharge or demotion, she was performing her job at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) her discharge or demotion occurred under circumstances that raise a reasonable inference or unlawful discrimination. To state a prima facie case of discrimination with regard to disciplinary measures, a Plaintiff who is a member of a protected class must show: (1) that she "engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a person of another race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, and (2) that disciplinary measures enforced against [her] were more severe than those enforced against the other person."

Even though Ms. Taylor is a member of a protected class and she was demoted, she had not alleged facts sufficient to survive Patuxent’s Motion to Dismiss. Based upon the "incident" and the several complaints for "various infractions," including insubordination, Ms. Taylor had not sufficiently pled that she was performing her job satisfactorily. Rather, as she admitted in her Complaint, her demotion was specifically the result of her engagement in what Patuxent believed was prohibited behavior. Likewise, she did not allege any facts suggesting that she engaged in prohibited conduct similar to that of a person of another race or gender, or that the disciplinary measures taken against her were more severe than those taken against the other person.

2. Retaliation

Ms. Taylor had failed to allege that she had engaged in protected activity; therefore, her retaliation claim failed. To establish a -prima facie_ case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show that she: (1) engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer acted adversely against her; and (3) the protected activity and the adverse action were casually connected. If a plaintiff shows that he or she opposed discriminatory practices by "complain[ing] to his or her employer or paticipat[ing] in an employer’s informal grievance procedure in an orderly and nondisruptive manner," then the employee’s activities are entitled to protection.

Ms. Taylor had simply not alleged that she ever complained to Patuxent about discrimination or other unlawful employment practices; therefore, her claim was dismissed.

3. Constructive Discharge

The elements of constructive discharge are: "(1) the deliberateness of [the employer’s] actions, motivated by racial [or sexual] bias, and (2) the objective intolerability of the working conditions." Ms. Taylor however, failed to allege any facts suggesting that her demotion was a deliberate attempt to induce her to quit. The fact that disciplinary complaints were filed against her on several occasions did not by itself raise an inference that Patuxent deliberately sought her resignation. Moreover, Ms. Taylor had not alleged facts showing that she was subjected to objectively intolerable working conditions. Specifically, she did not support her allegation that she was the "target of continuous harassment," with any facts. Accordingly, her constructive discharge claim was dismissed.

B. Due Process

Ms. Taylor alleged that Patuxent violated her due process rights by demoting her to the rank of Lieutenant without giving her "notice of charges upon which the hearing to demote was predicated." Assuming that she had a protected interest in her continued employment, due process requires only that "as a prerequisite to an intentional deprivation of a protected property interest, the government must provide some notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case."

Ms. Taylor did not plead sufficient facts to state a claim under the Due Process Clause and, therefore, her claim was dismissed. First, her resignation was voluntary and therefore the Due Process Clause was not implicated because the State did not deprive her of a property interest. Second, she was given the option of having a hearing prior to her announced demotion, as shown by the procedures Patuxent followed under Maryland law. Furthermore, she was given information about her appeal rights.


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