An administrative agency's subpoena power is broad, in order to enforce an administrative subpoena, the EEOC must only show: (1) that the investigation is within the agency's authority, (2) that relevant procedural requirements have been followed, and (3) the information sought is relevant to the investigation. The essential question is whether legislative immunity and its attendant evidentiary privilege override the EEOC's administrative authority.

The Court noted that the Supreme Court has previously held that privileges with a Constitutional foundation or historical or statutory basis may provide a sufficient bar to enforcement of administrative subpoenas. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990). The Court opined that legislative immunity is, indeed, embedded in the Federal Constitution, and dates back to the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries. Therefore, the Court found that it was likely that an assertion of legislative immunity would be a sufficient objection to the administrative subpoena if WSSC qualifies for legislative immunity.

The Court briefly discussed the important distinction between legislative immunity and legislative privilege. The Court noted: "[T]he purpose of legislative immunity is to ensure that the legislative function may be performed independently without fear of outside interference." Supreme Court of Va v. Consumers Union of the U.S., 446 U.S. 719, 731-32 (1980). On the other hand, "[L]egislative privilege . . . is an evidentiary and testimonial privilege that prohibits evidence of legislative acts from being used against legislators in proceedings." In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 953 (3d Cir. 1987). The Court found that the legislative immunity argument would prevent enforcement only to the extent that WSSC actually engaged in legislative actions and that the subpoena sought documents relating to such a legislative decision.

The Court stated that employment and personnel decisions generally involve administrative acts, which should not invoke the protection of legislative immunity. "The essential factor leading to an application of legislative immunity is whether the action has broad, more general, policy implications or merely ‘singles out specific individuals.'" Alexander v. Holden, 66 F.3d 62, 65 (4th Cir. 1995).

The Court found then that majority of the documents being sought by the EEOC related to administrative actions such as the hiring of new employees, training of those employees, and discipline of employees whether before or after the reorganization. Therefore, the Court determined that the EEOC was entitled to these documents, and WSSC was not protected by its assertion of legislative immunity.

Notably, the Court found that the only items being sought that could potentially constitute legislative action involved the creation of a budget submitted to the County Council for Prince George's County and the specific reorganization of the IT Department. The EEOC withdrew its request for these documents at oral argument, so that issue became moot by the time of the Court's decision.