The individual involved, Katrina Vaughn, filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on January 17, 2008, alleging that Freeman discriminated against her on the basis of race under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when Freeman rejected her from employment based on her credit history. After considering Ms. Vaughn's allegations and investigating the same, the EEOC filed this Complaint in the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland under Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) and 707 of Title VII.

The EEOC generally alleged that dating back to February, 2001 Freeman engaged in an ongoing nationwide pattern or practice of race, national origin, and sex discrimination against black, Hispanic and male job applicants. Specifically, the EEOC found that use of credit history and criminal history as hiring criteria had a disparate impact on these classes of persons, were not job-related, and that there were more appropriate, less discriminatory alternative selection procedures available.

Freeman filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss based on the fact that the EEOC was seeking remedies for a class of people that included those affected by Freeman's unlawful employment practices dating back to 2001, even though Ms. Vaughn's Complaint was made in January of 2008. Freeman argued that based on the 300-day timeframe for an individual to file a charge with the EEOC after a discriminatory practice occurs, any prior actions relating to others that occurred before that time period were time-barred.

The District Court agreed with Freeman's position, stating "EEOC may not seek relief for individuals who were denied employment more than 300 days before the filing of the administrative charge." The Court arrived at this conclusion "based on the plain language of Sections 706 and 707 and on the inapplicability of the continuing violation doctrine."

The Court noted that under Section 707, an individual wishing to challenge an employment practice needs to file a charge with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred, and claims not filed within this time limit are considered time-barred.

The EEOC argued that the statutory section only served to limit the EEOC's administrative function and investigative procedures, not its scope of remedies when actually becoming a litigant. The District Court disagreed, stating "nothing in the text of Section 706 or 707 suggests that the EEOC can recover for individuals whose claims are otherwise time-barred. If Congress intended to make an exception for the EEOC to revive still claims . . . it should have done so." EEOC v. Freeman at*8

The EEOC also argued that it could bring claims dating back to 2001 based on the continuing violation doctrine. The continuing violation doctrine is implemented when a plaintiff can demonstrate an "ongoing pattern of discrimination and that at least one act of discrimination occurred during the charging period". Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 139-42 (4th Cir. 2007). The continuing violation doctrine is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), when the Supreme Court explained that "unlike discreet acts of discrimination, hostile environment claims depend on the cumulative effect of individual acts across time."

The EEOC argued under Morgan that Freeman has a pattern or practice of refusing to hire job applicants based on discriminatory means. The District Court stated, however, that the continuing violation doctrine, while applicable to individual events that occur in a repeated fashion over time, only applies when those individual events happen to the same person. The continuing violation doctrine does not encompass multiple actions affecting a class of persons over time as existed here. Therefore, the District Court held that any claims based on the actions or activities of Defendant Company Freeman that occurred prior to March 23, 2007 (300 days prior to January 17, 2008) should be dismissed, and Freeman's Partial Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim was granted.