On May 25, 2005, Officer Houghton, Defendant, observed a drug sale through a security camera feed and dispatched an arresting team with instructions to arrest the participants. Because the drug transaction appeared to occur in multiple nearby locations, Officer Houghton had only an obstructed view of some of the locations. He still, however, instructed the arresting officers to search and arrest Plaintiff Cheryl Forrest, a bystander, who in reality had no connection to the drug deal. When the arresting officers suggested Officer Houghton review the film a second time, he refused. After the arresting officers searched Plaintiff Forrest and found no contraband, Officer Houghton still insisted she be arrested. Forrest was taken to Central Booking, though she was never summoned to court and charges were eventually dropped.

Forrest filed suit alleging intentional torts, including assault, battery, false imprisonment, and violations of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The case was tried in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, where the jury found Houghton acted with malice, and therefore immunity did not apply, and awarded actual and compensatory damages.

Houghton appealed to the Court of Special Appeals arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice and that immunity actually applied. Forrest argued that the evidence was sufficient and, in the alternative, that immunity does not apply to intentional torts. The Court of Special Appeals held that (1) common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts, and there are no other applicable bases for immunity, and (2) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a finding of malice, but that the Local Government Tort Claims Action ("LGTCA") allowed Forrest to enforce her claims against the Baltimore City Police Department.

The Court considered both common law and statutory immunity to Officer Houghton. First, the Court held that common law immunity did not apply to Officer Houghton. Common law public official immunity is reserved for public officials who perform negligent acts during the course of discretionary duties. Police officers are public officials and making arrests are discretionary acts. However, common law public official immunity does not apply to intentional torts. As the jury found the arresting officers committed intentional torts at Officer Houghton's behest, the Court held common law immunity did not apply.

There are three bases for statutory immunity: (1) Municipal Official Immunity, (2) Maryland Tort Claims Act, and (3) Governmental Official Immunity. The Municipal Official Immunity is codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-507 and provides limited immunity for officials of municipal corporations. Municipal Official Immunity does not apply to Officer Houghton, however, as the Baltimore City Police Department is a state agency created by the Maryland General Assembly, not a municipal corporation.

Additionally, Officer Houghton cannot avail himself to the Maryland Tort Claims Act, codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-101(a). Immunity under the MTCA is restricted to individuals only paid by or under the direct control of the State.

Lastly, Governmental Official Immunity, codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-511, is not available to Officer Houghton. That provision creates immunity for officials of a "governmental entity," defined as a special taxing district which:

(1) Is a unit of government responsible for an area situated solely within a single county;
(2) Has a governing body elected independently of the county government;
(3) Is financed with revenues secured in whole or in part from special taxes or assessments levied on real property situated within the area;
(4) Performs municipal services for the residents of the area; and
(5) Was not created for a limited or special purpose or purposes.

A special taxing district is an area designated by a municipality in which a special tax is levied, through a grant of authority from the General Assembly, in order to fund specific public works and construction projects. The Baltimore City Police Department cannot be said to be a special taxing district, and therefore, the immunity does not apply.

Finally, Forrest argued on cross-appeal that the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that insufficient evidence to support malice. The Court did not consider this issue because the LGTCA holds the Baltimore City Police Department liable for acts of its employees committed in the course of performance of duties, regardless of malice.

Accordingly, the Court held that there was no source of immunity for Officer Houghton. Furthermore, there was no need to determine whether he acted with malice, as the Baltimore City Police Department is liable for the judgment regardless.