Plaintiff Charles Dise filed suit against his employer Express Marine, Inc. ("EMI") to recover damages for injuries he sustained at work. EMI, a corporation in the shipping industry, had employed Dise as an assistant engineer since 2005. EMI required that Dise take barge draft readings from a skiff. Dise drove the skiff at high speeds and failed to see a railroad bridge in his path. After crashing the skiff into the bridge and sustaining permanent injuries, Dise then sued EMI. In response, EMI filed a counterclaim in the amount of $3,254.96 for damages to the skiff. The Court found Dise negligent, dismissed his claims for damages, and then considered whether to grant EMI's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Counterclaim.

Judge Blake found summary judgment appropriate since neither party contested any relevant facts, nor did Dise dispute the amount of damages to the skiff. She then noted that the Fourth Circuit had not addressed the issue of whether an employer-shipowner could sue an employee under the Jones Act to recover property damages. In this case of first impression, the Court determined how to apply two relevant statutes to the case: the Jones Act and the Federal Employer's Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § 51.

The Court first summarized the legal background of how the two statutes interact and relate to the dispute at hand. The Jones Act determines employer liability to seamen. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that the Jones Act incorporates the judicially developed doctrine of liability under FELA and all the pre-existing common law remedies. Thus, the two statutes and the common law applied.

Additionally, while the Fourth Circuit has not considered employer-shipowners' counterclaims, it has held in Cavanaugh v. W. Md. Ry. Col, 729 F.2d 289 at 284 that FELA permits a railroad employer's counterclaim against an employee for property damages. Judge Blake also noted that the Fifth Circuit held in Withhart v. Otto Candies, L.L.C., 431 F.3d 840 at 843–45 that the Jones Act does not preclude employer-shipowner counterclaims like EMI's.

After considering the relevant legal background and applicable law, Judge Blake held that EMI's counterclaim was permissible under the Jones Act for several reasons. First, allowing employer counterclaims such as EMI's does not limit any remedies available to employees under the Jones Act. Second, an employee's negligence was actionable under maritime law before Congress enacted the Jones Act. Lastly, Judge Blake considered the compulsory counterclaim provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a). Rule 13 would not permit EMI to file a separate lawsuit against Dise since EMI's claim arises out of the same event (Dise's negligence) as Dise's original claim against EMI. Thus, barring EMI's counterclaim would leave EMI without any legal recourse.

After considering the common law, the law of other Circuits, and the lack of any disputed material facts, the Court granted EMI's summary judgment motion against Dise, thereby ordering Dise to pay damages for his negligent operation of the skiff.