First, the Court explored whether UMMS was an “instrumentality of the state,” which would bring it within the auspices of the PIA. The Court visited the history of UMMS, noting that it was formed as a private, non-profit corporate entity. However, the assets that formed UMMS came from the State, and the State has remained active in its operations—for instance, Board members must be appointed by the Governor and the State has the power to terminate UMMS. Overall, because the State remained a visible and compelling force in its operations, the Court reasoned that UMMS was indeed an “instrumentality of the state.”

Second, the Court considered whether an exception to the PIA applied. The Court concluded that, even though it was an instrumentality of the state, UMMS was not compelled to turn over the records requested by Petitioner Napata under the PIA. This is because the UMMS enacting statute explicitly exempted it from any laws “affecting only governmental or public entities.” Because the PIA is a law only affecting public entities, and the UMMS enacting statute specifically exempts it from such laws, UMMS had no obligation to turn over the records Petitioner Napata sought.

Specifically, the Court held that, “although UMMS is an ‘instrumentality of the State’ for purposes of the PIA, an express exemption from laws affecting only governmental or public entities located in the corporation’s enacting statute shields it from the public information law.” In so holding, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which came to the same conclusion.