Peggy McQuitty filed a medical malpractice action including an informed consent claim on behalf of her minor son, against Franklin Square Hospital and her obstetrician, Dr. Spangler. Ms. McQuitty went to Franklin Square Hospital on March 30, 1995 because she was twenty-eight weeks pregnant, and she began experiencing vaginal bleeding. She saw Dr. Spangler, and he observed that she had a placental abruption, which is when the placenta begins to tear away from the uterus. This is very dangerous because the placenta provides the fetus with nutrients and oxygen. Any separation of the placenta from the uterus can kill the child. Dr. Spangler told Ms. McQuitty that if she remained at the hospital under constant monitoring then her unborn child could survive. He also advised her of the dangerous option of having a Cesarean section. A Cesarean section would be dangerous because the child's lungs were not fully developed and, as a result, her son might not survive the procedure. Ms. McQuitty opted to remain at the hospital.

On April 12, 1995, Ms. McQuitty suffered an additional and severe abruption. Dr. Spangler did not tell Ms. McQuitty that she could have a Cesarean section at this point because the fetus would still run a severe risk of death due to undeveloped lungs and she had already chosen to wait until the lungs were developed to have a Cesarean section.

On May 8, 1995, Ms. McQuitty suffered a complete abruption, and Dr. Spangler performed an emergency Cesarean section. As a result of the complete abruption, the child suffered permanent neurologic injuries. Ms. McQuitty sued on the child's behalf to recover for those injuries.

Both the Circuit Court of Baltimore County and the Court of Special Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the plaintiff did not allege an affirmative physical invasion. The Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals each found support for its ruling in Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 630 A.2d 1145 (1993). That case cited the New York case of Karlson v. Guerinot, which held that the tort of informed consent grew out of the common law pleading for battery and, therefore, it required that the plaintiff prove an affirmative physical violation. 57 A.D.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). However, Reed did not cite Karlson for that proposition and the Court in Reed decided the case on different grounds.

The Court of Appeals overruled the Court of Special Appeals and held that the tort of informed consent is derived from a negligence claim and that the gravamen of the tort is the healthcare provider's duty to provide information to the patient. The Court of Appeals found that the Circuit Court and the Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted Reed by relying on an out-of-state case that it cited for a different proposition. It found that the very purpose of the tort of informed consent is to promote plaintiff's informed choice and a requirement of a physical invasion contravenes that purpose. Therefore, to assert a prima facie claim of informed consent, a plaintiff is only required to show that a healthcare provider failed to discuss all of the treatment options with the plaintiff and the material risks associated with those options.