Motion for Attorneys' Fees Must be Filed Within 14 Days From Summary Judgment
(October 2009) By Tamiya N. Wilkes, Associate.
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
First Penn-Pacific Life Ins., Co. v. Evans, et al., Civil No. WDQ-05-0444 (D. Md. October 5, 2009)
First Penn-Pacific Life Insurance Company ("First Penn")
filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
seeking to rescind a life insurance policy ("the Policy"), arguing that William
Evans "("Evans") had fraudulently procured the Policy.
Evans filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that First
Penn could not rescind the Policy because it had failed to contest the Policy
within two years, as required by the terms of the Policy and Arizona law – which
governed the policy. The Court granted Evans' Motion for Summary Judgment.
First Penn filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment under
Fed R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing that the grant of summary judgment erroneously
applied Arizona insurance law. First Penn's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
was denied. First Penn appealed the Order denying its Rule 59(e), Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court's
ruling denying First Penn's motion and affirming summary judgment on Evan's
behalf.
Following the Fourth Circuit's ruling, Evans filed a Motion
for Attorneys' Fees. First Penn contested the Motion for Attorney's Fees arguing
that the motion was untimely, pursuant to Local Rule 109 (D. Md. R. 109), which
states that "any motion requesting the award of attorneys' fees must be filed
within fourteen days of the entry of judgment…[failure to do so] shall be deemed
a waiver of any claim for attorneys' fees."
First Penn argued that Local Rule 109, required Evans to
file his Motion for Attorneys' Fees within fourteen days from the Court's entry
of summary judgment – not from the date of denial of the Motion to Alter or
Amend; therefore, Evans had waived his claim to attorneys' fees.
Evans contended that his Motion for Attorneys' Fees was
timely, as it was filed within fourteen days from the Court's Order denying
First Penn's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. According to Evans, Local Rule
109 is inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, which broadly defines "entry of
judgment" to include rulings on Rule 59(e) motions; therefore, Local Rule 109
should be interpreted consistently with Rule 54.
The Court agreed with First Penn, holding that "[u]nder
Local Rule 109, an order denying a Rule 59(e) motion is not an "entry of
judgment;"" therefore, Evans' Motion for Attorneys' fees was untimely as it
should have been filed within fourteen days from the Order granting summary
judgment in his favor. The Court further held that Local Rule 109 is not
inconsistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 54. The Court stated that the timing
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, may be varied by an order of the court and
it is well settled that Local Rules constitute orders of court—"a local rule
varying the time to file a motion for fees is a standing order."
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