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Statutory Cap on Non-economic Damages Passes Constitutional Muster, Again

In Re: DRD Pool Service, Inc. v. Thomas Freed, et. al., Master Case No.: 104-2009 (Md., September 24, 2010) | View pdf

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the statutory cap on non-economic damages passes constitutional muster. The Court affirmed the Court of Special Appeals based on principles of stare decisis and rational basis review.

On June 26, 2006, a five-year-old boy attended a public swimming pool in Anne Arundel County with family friends. At some point during the afternoon, the young boy went missing and was discovered floating in the pool face down. Tragically, the young boy had drowned.

The young boy's surviving parents (hereinafter “The Freeds”) brought an action against the pool management company, DRD Pool Service, Inc. (hereinafter “DRD”) seeking monetary relief on the basis of the wrongful death and mental anguish they have experienced since the passing of their child. A jury found DRD negligent and awarded the Freeds $4,006,442.00. Pursuant to the Maryland statutory cap on non-economic damages, codified at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §11-108, the trial court reduced the wrongful death award to $1,002,500.00, which included $5,000.00 for funeral expenses.

The statutory cap was first enacted in 1986. It provided that in actions for personal injury, the award for non-economic damages may not exceed $350,000.00. In 1994, the statutory cap was raised to $500,000.00 and the cap was extended to a wrongful death causes of action. The limitation increases each year by $15,000.00. For actions arising in June 2006, the cap was $665,000.00 per beneficiary, with a maximum of $997,500.00 for all beneficiaries. Initially, the purpose of the cap on non-economic damages was to address the medical malpractice insurance crisis in Maryland. The statutory cap allowed insurance companies to predict the amount of damages to be awarded at trial, which led to better estimates on costs, and ultimately lower premiums for customers.

The Freeds filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment challenging the constitutionality of the statutory cap. The Freeds argued that the statutory cap violated their right to a jury under Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and are guaranteed equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights. The trial court denied the Freeds’ motion and the Freeds timely noted and appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting that the Court of Appeals had rejected similar arguments twice, previously. See DRD Pool Service, Inc. v. Freed, et. al., No. 104, at *7 citing Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24 (1995); Murphy v. Edmond, 325 Md. 342 (1992). The Court of Special Appeals determined that it was bound by the precedents enunciated by the Court of Appeals.

On appeal to the highest appellate court, the Freeds argued that the statutory cap did not pass constitutional muster because there is no rational basis to continue “the discrimination against the most seriously injured non-medical malpractice tort claimant.” See DRD Pool Service, Inc., No. 104, at *8.

The Freeds argued that the statutory cap limited their access to the courts and their right to a jury trial. Thus, the Freeds argued in favor of a heightened level of scrutiny when analyzing the statutory cap. The Court rejected this argument because the statutory cap does not limit Plaintiffs’ access to courts, rather it limits the award that may be available at the outcome of a tort case. Moreover, the right to a jury trial is not affected by the cap.

The Freeds next argued that their right to equal protection is violated by the statutory cap because it created a classification between the less seriously injured plaintiffs who are entitled to keep all money damages awarded at trial, and more seriously plaintiffs, whose damages are limited by the statutory cap. Accordingly, the Freeds argued that a heightened standard of review is warranted based on the equal protection discrimination. The Court rejected this argument and relied upon United Stated Supreme Court standards for reviewing classifications and held that economic classifications are regularly tested under a rational basis test.

Finally, the Freeds argued that even under a rational basis test, the cap failed scrutiny. Rational basis tests are extremely deferential and even presume that the test is constitutional. A statute will be struck down under rational basis analysis only if no rational purpose supports the law or it interferes with a fundamental right. Here, the Court explained that the Legislature had ample reasoning for passing this statutory cap. The cap is intended to regulate the insurance industry and provide some measure by which insurance companies can predict the outcome of tort claims thereby allowing them to better assess their premiums. Also, the cap did not interfere with any fundamental rights.

The Court of Appeals in Maryland affirmed the trial court and its past precedent and held that the statutory cap on non-economic damages passes constitutional muster.

The Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. dissented and opined that the trial court should have applied a heightened scrutiny test to determine the constitutionality of the cap as it violates equal protection rights.


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