In 1999, Mrs. Holmes suffered a work-related injury while an employee at Wal-Mart and was awarded temporary total disability benefits by the Workers' Compensation Commission (the "Commission"). After seven years, Mrs. Holmes reached maximum medical improvement and, in the normal course of events, she would have applied for an award for either permanent partial or permanent total disability benefits. However, before she could do so, she died from non-work related injuries.

Thereafter, Mr. Holmes sought permanent disability benefits. All parties involved agreed that Mr. Holmes' right, if any, to pursue his wife's claim for permanent disability benefits was controlled by § 9-632 of the Act. Section 9-632 of the Act provides in pertinent part:

(d) no surviving dependants; obligation to support surviving spouse. —If there are no surviving dependants of the covered employee and, on the date of death, the covered employee had a legal obligation to support a surviving spouse, the right to compensation survives jointly to:

(1) the surviving spouse of the covered employee; and

(2) the surviving minor children of the covered employee.

(Emphasis added).

Mr. Holmes testified that his income and his wife's workers' compensation benefits were combined to meet their living expenses. The ultimate issue before the Commission, then, was whether Mr. Holmes had demonstrated that his wife had a legal obligation to support him at the time of her death. The Commission found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mrs. Holmes had a legal obligation to support Mr. Holmes; therefore, the right to compensation did not survive Mrs. Holmes' death and the issue of permanency was moot. Mr. Holmes appealed and the Circuit Court affirmed the Commission. Mr. Holmes then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

In making its decision the Court of Special Appeals stated that the first step was to determine whether the phrase "legal obligation to support a surviving spouse" in § 9-632(d) was ambiguous. The disagreement between the parties on this phrase centered on whether it was intended to embrace all married people except those who, by contract or court order, are relieved of the obligation of spousal support or whether it was intended to extend only to those married persons who were obligated by contract or court order to provide for a spouse's support. In light of the statute's ambiguity, the court decided to look at its legislative history.

The court found that the purpose of the amendments to the Act was clear. Specifically, the court found that the General Assembly intended for the amendments to protect dependants, wives, and minor children. Specifically, the court wrote, "If a worker supported his wife, she would be his dependant and her eligibility for benefits would be determined by what is now § 9-632©. If he failed to support his wife, regardless of his legal obligation to do so, she was not his dependant. What is now § 9-632(d) provides that the right to benefits would survive to her unless her own misconduct had relieved her husband of the obligation of support. This interpretation is consistent with what was then § 42 of the Act."

In addition, the court noted that when the statutory predecessor to § 9-632(d) was enacted in 1947, Maryland law recognized that husbands generally had an affirmative, enforceable legal obligation to support their wives. From that legal obligation, the court concluded that the General Assembly used the term "a legal obligation on the part of said employee to support his wife," to describe this duty, as opposed to a specific requirement imposed by a court order or a written agreement. However, the court was quick to note that Maryland's adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment and Cruickshank-Wallace v. County Banking and Trust Co., 165 Md. App. 300 (2005) make clear that the obligation to support a spouse is mutual for both husbands and wives.