While driving in the District of Columbia in 2003, Mr. Leach
struck Mr. Kortobi's car. At that time, Mr. Leach was a resident of the District
of Columbia and Mr. Kortobi was a resident of Virginia. Over a year later, Mr.
Leach died from causes unrelated to the automobile accident. An estate was
opened in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia
and Brian L. Kass, Esq., a Maryland resident and an attorney with offices in the
District of Columbia, was appointed personal representative of Leach's estate.
After Mr. Kass's appointment, Mr. Kortobi filed suit
asserting claims arising out of the car accident in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County against Mr. Kass, in his capacity as personal representative. As
a resident of Maryland, Mr. Kass was served at his Howard County home. Lower
courts dismissed the Complaint because Mr. Kass, as a foreign personal
representative, had insufficient contacts with the State of Maryland to support
personal jurisdiction. It was undisputed that the Leach Estate had no contacts
with the State of Maryland.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, Mr. Kortobi
presented a twofold argument that Maryland had personal jurisdiction over Mr.
Kass. First, Mr. Kortobi argued that Md. Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 5-502(a)
plainly provided that a foreign personal representative may be sued in Maryland.
Secondly, Mr. Kortobi argued that personal service to Mr. Kass's residence in
Maryland established personal jurisdiction pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. &
Jud. Proc. § 6-102.
Maryland Code Ann., Est. & Trusts § 5-502(a) provides:
(a) In general. – Any foreign personal representative may
exercise in Maryland all powers of his office, and may sue and be sued in
Maryland, subject to any statute or rule relating to nonresidents.
Mr. Kortobi argued that a plain language reading of this
provision allowed Mr. Kass to "sue and be sued" as personal representative. On
the other hand, Mr. Kass argued that the language "subject to any statute or
rule relating to nonresidents" made applicable Maryland's Long-Arm Statute, an
additional jurisdictional hurdle that Mr. Kass maintained was not satisfied.
Upon examining legislative history, the Court concluded that
"of his office" is intended to instill the powers to be exercised in Maryland as
they would have been exercised in appointing jurisdiction. In other words, a
foreign personal representative's power is determined by the laws of the
appointing jurisdiction. The personal residence of the representative receives
no consideration. Here, the Court turned to the laws of the District of Columbia
to determine whether Mr. Kass could be sued in a foreign jurisdiction, such as
Maryland.
District of Columbia law codifies the powers of a personal
representative in Title 20, Chapter 7 of the D.C. Code. The relevant portion
reads:
(c) Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death
of the decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in the
District of Columbia at his death has the same standing to sue and be sued in
the courts of this and any other jurisdiction as the decedent had immediately
prior to death.
D.C. Code § 20-701©. Applying this law, the Court found that
Mr. Kass had the same standing to sue and be sued that Mr. Leach enjoyed
immediately prior to his death. The question became whether Mr. Kortobi could
have sued Mr. Leach in Maryland for injuries sustained in the District of
Columbia car accident.
Before addressing that personal jurisdiction question, the
Court disposed of the threshold issue of interpreting remaining language found
in § 5-502(a), which provides that a personal representative "may sue or be sued
in Maryland, subject to any statute or rule relating to nonresidents." Even if
Mr. Kortobi stands in the shoes of Mr. Leach to enjoy the same jurisdictional
reaches, Maryland's statute will still apply any laws relating to suing a
nonresident. Mr. Kortobi argues that this language encompasses Maryland's
Long-Arm Statute, codified at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §6-103. Based on
the legislative history of the provision, the Court agrees.
Maryland personal jurisdiction is governed by Courts &
Judicial Proceedings Article, § 6-102. That provision reads:
(a) Basis of personal jurisdiction. – A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person domiciled in,
served with process in, organized under the laws of, or who maintains his
principal place of business in the State.
Mr. Kortobi maintained that the plain language of § 6-102
provided personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kass because Mr. Kass was a resident of
Maryland and was served with process at his residence. The Court disagreed and
found that § 6-102 was inapplicable to the instant facts. Mr. Kass was served
with process in his capacity as a foreign personal representative. As previously
explained, that means Mr. Kass stood in the shoes of Mr. Leach, a nonresident
Defendant. Therefore, personal jurisdiction over Mr. Kass as a foreign personal
representative was accomplished through § 6-103, Maryland's Long-Arm Statute.
Maryland's Long-Arm Statute is found at Md. Code Ann., Cts.
& Jud. Proc., § 6-103, and provides:
(a) Condition. – If jurisdiction over a person is based
solely upon this section, he may be sued only on a cause of action arising from
any act enumerated in this section.
(b) In general. – A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a person, who directly or by an agent:
(1) Transactions any business or performs any character of
work or service in the State; (2) Contracts to supply goods, food, services, or
manufactured products in the state; (3) Causes tortuous injury in the State by
an act or omission in the State; (4) Causes tortuous injury in the State or
outside of the State by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly
does or solicits business, engages in any other pertinent course of conduct in
the State or derives substantial revenue from goods, food, service, or
manufactured products used or consumed in the State; (5) Has an interest in,
uses, or possesses real property in the State; or (6) Contracts to insure or act
as surety for, or on, any person, property, risk, contract, obligation, or
agreement located, executed, or to be performed with the State at the time the
contract is made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
In addition to satisfying this statutory provision, personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant must not offend principles of Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause. A foreign defendant must maintain minimum contacts
with Maryland so that exercising personal jurisdiction "does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Kortobi, No. 140, at
16 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (internal
quotes omitted).
The Court found Mr. Kass' only contacts with Maryland were
his personal residence and his being served with process at his residence. Those
contacts did not aid in establishing personal jurisdiction in the instant matter
since he was served in his representative capacity. Thus, the Court only
considered what contacts Mr. Leach enjoyed with Maryland. Mr. Kass stood in Mr.
Leach's shoes to enjoy the same contacts.
The record established that Mr. Leach and all of his
beneficiaries were residents of the District of Columbia, all of his assets were
located in the District of Columbia, and that the car accident giving rise to
the present matter occurred in the District of Columbia. Those contacts failed
to satisfy the Long-Arm Statute and due process requirements. Accordingly, the
Court affirmed the lower court and held that there was no personal jurisdiction
over a foreign personal representative, despite the representative's Maryland
residency and service in the State.
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