Plaintiff was employed with the USPS from 1986 through
2010. At all relevant times, she was a general expediter at the incoming mail
facility in Maryland. Following a 1990 work-related accident, Plaintiff claimed
continuing and substantial injuries. Despite extensive treatment and physical
therapy, she claimed physical limitations that affected her job performance.
Plaintiff sought modified and limited duty assignments. Her duties as an
expediter remained largely the same although with certain medical restrictions.
Plaintiff made several complaints to her supervisors
regarding accommodation requests that were denied. Further, she alleges that
as a result of her complaints, unwarranted disciplinary actions were
implemented. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against
as a result of her disability.
Following the round of disciplinary actions taken by
USPS, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on January 30, 2008. After that informal
complaint was closed, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the EEOC in
September 2008. The EEOC ultimately dismissed the formal discrimination
complaint on February 2, 2010 and advised Plaintiff that she had the right
to sue in Federal district court within ninety (90) days of the final EEOC
decision. Accordingly, the deadline for her suit was May 3, 2010.
Plaintiff filed her Complaint with the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland on April 30, 2010. Less than two
weeks before the filing, on April 21, 2010, Plaintiff was advised that her
employment with USPS was to be terminated effective July 5, 2010. She was
considered officially terminated as of July 21, 2010. After her official
termination, Plaintiff sought to add a count for retaliatory termination.
Accordingly, she filed a Motion for Leave to Amend her Complaint.
Defendant opposed the Motion to Amend the Complaint
arguing that Plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies with
regard to her termination claim. Defendant argued that Plaintiff must file a
separate EEOC retaliation complaint and go through the administrative
process.
Based on the precedent from the Fourth Circuit, the
U.S. District Court held that once a party has properly filed an EEOC charge
for discrimination, that party is not required to file a new charge for
retaliation that was related to the claims made in the initial charge.
See Plunkett v. Potter, Civil Action No.
RDB-10-1096, at 6 (citing Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590 (4th Cir.
1992). Accordingly, as Plaintiff had initiated her claim properly with the
EEOC, she could now amend her Complaint with the United States District
Court to include retaliatory termination.