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No Posthumous Liens On Real Property

Emma Elder v. Cherry Elder Smith, No. 34 (Md. Jan. 13, 2010),
available at http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2010/34a09.pdf

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a lien cannot be created against a debtor's interest in real property after the debtor's death because title to real property passes immediately upon death.

Emma Elder and Colonel Percy Elder were divorced in 2002 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Ms. Elder was awarded $31,500 as a marital award and was supposed to receive one half of the proceeds of a sale property located in Anne Arundel County known as "Beales Trail." Ms. Elder never reduced her award to judgment, so it remained unsatisfied at Mr. Elder's death in 2005. Subsequently, Ms. Elder obtained an order from the Circuit Court of Baltimore City reducing her marital award to a judgment against Mr. Elder. She then recorded the judgment in Anne Arundel County intending to attach a lien against the Beales Trail property. Prior to the sale of Beales Trail, the Orphans' Court for Baltimore County ordered Ms. Elder to release her lien because her award which was reduced to judgment after Mr. Elder's death was not entitled to priority within the context of estate administration. Ms. Elder appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that a creditor may not enhance a pre-death claim to priority after the debtor dies. Ms. Elder then petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari, which was granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Ms. Elder argued that the plain language meaning of three statutory provisions allowed her to enforce her judgment in Anne Arundel County. First, she pointed to MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-402© which provides:

Judgment of another court – is indexed and recorded as prescribed by the Maryland Rules, a monetary judgment constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor's interest and land located in a county other than the county in which the judgment was originally entered . . .

The second provision is MD. CODE ANN., ESTATES & TRUSTS § 8-103, which provides in relevant part:

(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by a statute with respect to claims of the United States and the state, all claims against an estate of a decedent, whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, are forever barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and legatees, unless presented within the earlier of the following dates: . . .

(d) Liens Not Affected. – Nothing in this section shall affect or prevent an action or proceeding to enforce a mortgage, pledge, judgment or other lien, or security interest upon property of the estate.

The final provision is MD. CODE ANN., ESTATES & TRUSTS § 8-114, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) General – an execution or levy shall not issue nor be made against property of the estate under a judgment against a decedent or a personal representative. Exception. – the provisions of this section do not apply to the enforcement of mortgages, pledges, liens, or other security interests upon property in an appro- priate proceeding.

A review of the legislative history of § 11-402© revealed that the section was first enacted in 1890. Since then, the Court found no discussion of the provision recognizing the validity of a lien recorded against real property after the debtor's death.

The Court also looked to the legislative history of §§ 8-103(d) and 8-114(b) of the Estates & Trusts Article. Again, the Court found no mention in the legislative history suggesting that the General Assembly would allow a pre-death claim reduced to judgment and recorded as a lien after the debtor's death to be valid.

The personal representative of Mr. Elder's estate argued that Ms. Elder actually had no interest in Beales Trail because the real property passed immediately from the decedent's estate upon death. The Court found this argument was dispositive of the case. Upon death, title to real property passes out of the hands of the decedent. Therefore, the Court concluded that the judgment obtained and recorded as a lien against Beales Trail after Mr. Elder's death is not afforded priority under the statutory scheme embodied by the Maryland Code because title to real property passes out of the decedent's hands after death.

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's judgment.


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