Whether the state law definition of 'child support' as an
ongoing obligation pursuant to [Sections] 12-200 et seq.
[of the Family Law Article (FL)] is appropriately used to determine whether an
entitlement or right awarded to a dependent of a participant, pursuant to a
domestic relations order, impermissibly frustrates the preemption provision and
the limited exception to the anti-alienation clause provided for by [ERISA].
Defendant abducted his son and took him to Turkey.
Plaintiff's request for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order, ("QDRO")
stemmed from a judgment that she obtained against the Defendant for
attorney's fees and costs that she incurred in her successful effort to have
her child returned to her custody in the United States. That judgment was
affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals.
In a Memorandum Opinion on Plaintiff's request for a
QDRO, the Circuit Court stated:
State law, not federal bankruptcy guidelines, defines
"child support in Maryland. The Court of Appeals in
Goldberg [v. Miller, 371 Md. 591, 810 A.2d 947 (2002)], clearly
stated that "[f]ederal bankruptcy law does not, in any way, bind this Court
in making decisions regarding matters of state law." 371 Md. at 610 [n.8,
810 A.2d at 958 n.8]. The Goldberg Court
explained that the policy considerations of bankruptcy law are unique to the
interpretations of the bankruptcy code and are not necessarily analogous to
state policy concerns. See id.
* * *
.... The Goldberg Court concluded that the General
Assembly, not federal law, was left as the "guiding authority for matters of
child support in Maryland." Id. at 612 [, 810
A.2d at 959]. Therefore, it follows that federal bankruptcy law does not
define what constitutes child support in the state of Maryland. Attorney's
fees and costs are not among the enumerated factors of the Maryland child
support guidelines, and this Court will not create such a factor in the
absence of legislative authority.
After Plaintiff noted an appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals, the Court issued a writ of certiorari
on its own initiative.
Appellant argued (in the words of her brief):
Child support is not defined [in ERISA], and therefore
must be given its plain meaning. ERISA preempts state law, therefore, the
meaning of child support that must be used is the meaning used in federal
law. A review of federal bankruptcy case law clearly establishes that child
support includes costs and fees incurred enforcing a child custody order.
Silverman v. Spiro [, 438 Mass. 725, 784
N.E.2d 1 (2003)], holds that "child support" includes costs incurred
pursuing custody of a child. For purposes of determining whether an
entitlement awarded to Appellant is enforceable through a QDRO, it must be
determined whether the "entitlement" "relates to" child support, as intended
within ERISA.
The Court, however, disagreed, did not find bankruptcy
law applicable, and relied upon the plain language of Md. Code Ann., Fam.
Law. § 12-103 and ERISA. Specifically, the Court noted that QDROs are
exempted from ERISA's preemption provisions. Moreover, a circuit court does
not have authority to characterize guardian ad litem
fees as child support.
The Court held that the Maryland definition of child
support is applicable to the determination of whether Plaintiff was entitled
to a QDRO and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. Therefore, under
Maryland law, Plaintiff was not entitled to a QDRO to enforce the judgment
entered against her child's father for counsel fees and costs that she
incurred in obtaining her child's return from Turkey.
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