Sanders moved for summary judgment, arguing that the renewal provision of the lease gave her an absolute right to renew the lease unilaterally, without Molla’s consent. Molla moved for summary judgment arguing that, under the terms of the lease, consent of both the landlord and tenant was required in order exercise the renewal option. The trial court found that the lease provision stating "[l]andlord and tenant shall have the option to renew this lease with a 10% increase per year," to be ambiguous. The trial court based its finding on the use of the terms "and" and "option" – the word "and" "usually bears a conjunctive meaning" and the word "option" "usually signifies a right exercisable by one, or either party, not by both acting in concert." Because of the ambiguity, the trial court considered extrinsic evidence, including testimony from the parties. The trial court granted summary judgment in Molla’s favor, finding that the lease did not prohibit Molla from raising Sanders’ rent. Additionally, the trial court found, based on Sanders’ own testimony, that the original landlord opposed a twelve-year lease and from this testimony, the trial court inferred that the original landlord did not grant Sanders the right to unilaterally renew the lease for a second five-year term. The trial court also awarded sanctions under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 11 against Sanders’ counsel for tactics which the trial court believed were "designed to drag out th[e] litigation."

Sanders appealed the trial court’s ruling to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ("Court of Appeals"), which affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s interpretation of the ambiguous lease provision was reasonable. The Court of Appeals also held that it had no jurisdiction to rule on Sanders’ challenge to the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions because a final order with respect to the sanctions had not been issued.