|
|
|
Reviving Claims on "Life Support" is Constitutional
(July 2009) By Gregory L. Arbogast, Summer Associate.
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Rice v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., No. 2870 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. July 6, 2009)
In Rice v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals addressed the constitutionality of the medical
malpractice statute of limitations as it applied to the facts of this particular
case. The medical malpractice statute of limitations states in pertinent part:
(b) Refiling of claim after dismissal. – If a civil action or
claim is commenced by a party within the applicable period of limitations and is
dismissed without prejudice, the party may commence a new civil action or claim
for the same cause against the same party or parties on or before the later of:
(1) The expiration of the applicable period of limitations; (2) 60 days from the date of the dismissal; or (3) August 1, 2007, if the action or claim was dismissed on or after November
17, 2006, but before June 1, 2007.
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-119(b) (2008).

Rice v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp. arose out of a
wrongful death medical malpractice action filed by Pearline Rice’s children
after Ms. Rice died of soft tissue cancer in her leg. The plaintiffs claimed
that the University of Maryland Medical System negligently misdiagnosed Ms.
Rice. However, when the plaintiffs filed the case, they did not attach the
certificate of merit required by Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §
3-2A-04(a)(1)(i) (2008). A certificate of merit is a, "certificate of a
qualified expert…attesting to departure from standards of care, and that the
departure from standards of care is the proximate cause of the alleged injury."
§ 3-2A-04(a)(1)(i). Due to the plaintiffs’ failure to attach the required
certificate of merit, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the case
without prejudice on January 18, 2007. The plaintiffs immediately appealed the
Circuit Court’s decision. While their appeal was pending, the plaintiffs also
refiled the case on July 23, 2007, before the August 1, 2007 deadline set forth
in § 5-119. The defendants moved to dismiss the refiled case because they
claimed it was time-barred and the Circuit Court granted the defendants’ motion.
The plaintiffs appealed the decision.
The Court of Special Appeals found that the Legislature has
the constitutional authority to extend the statute of limitations for cases in
which the statute of limitations has not yet expired; however, the Legislature
cannot revive an expired claim where the defendant has survived the period set
forth in the statute of limitations without being sued. The Legislature cannot
retroactively revive a stale claim. The defendants conceded that § 5-119
permitted the plaintiffs to refile the case, but they argued that § 5-119
violated their constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. They argued
that once the Circuit Court dismissed the case, the plaintiff’s claim became
stale and the Legislature violated their rights by reviving that stale claim.
The Court of Special Appeals agreed that the Legislature cannot revive a stale
claim, but they found that this case was not stale. Instead, the Court of
Special Appeals found that when the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the dismissal,
they kept the case, "on life support." If the Court of Special Appeals overruled
the Circuit Court, then this case would have been remanded and reopened.
Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals found that this case was not stale and
the Legislature could extend that statute of limitations and permit the
plaintiffs to refile the case. As such, under these particular facts, § 5-119
was not unconstitutional.
|
|
|