The Plaintiff, Renee Cuffee, was a female consultant for
Defendant, Verizon Communications, Inc. Hired in 1997, she obtained several
promotions, and by 2007, was Supervisor of Operations for the Virginia/West
Virginia region, and lead sales consultant on Verizon's Sell One More campaign.
The Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint alleged that she was sexually
harassed by Verizon on separate bases. During her employment with Verizon, she
was involved in a romantic relationship with a Verizon executive, Charles
Casteel. In September 2008, she learned that she was pregnant with Mr. Casteel's
child, and he allegedly tried to convince her to procure an abortion. Plaintiff
alleges that a security officer, Tillmon Figgs, called the Plaintiff to his
office and threatened to have her fired if she attempted to contact Mr. Casteel
further.
Additionally, she alleged—for the first time—that from
April 2008 to September 2008, she was subjected to sexual advances from
Tyrone Stephenson, the highest level executive in the region where Plaintiff
worked. The Plaintiff reported these unwanted advances to Mr. Figgs as the
security investigator, and approximately two months later she was removed
from her position as the lead sales consultant on the Sell One More
campaign.
Prior to bringing a Title VII sexual harassment
lawsuit, a plaintiff must file an administrative charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff did file a charge
letter with the EEOC which indicated discrimination based upon sex, and
detailed allegations regarding Mr. Casteel. The letter, like her original
Complaint, includes no allegation about sexual harassment from Mr.
Stephenson.
The Court noted that ordinarily leave is freely given
to amend complaints, however, one of the exceptions is when amending the
complaint would be futile. That is, the proposed amendments could not
withstand a motion to dismiss. Perkins v. United
States, 55 F.3d 910, 917 (4th Cir. 1995). The Plaintiff attempted to
amend her Complaint to allege three additional causes of action: a hostile
environment sexual harassment claim under Title VII; a retaliation claim
based on Title VII; and a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The Court found that each claim would be futile and, therefore,
Plaintiff was not entitled to amend her Complaint.
The Court determined that the Plaintiff's hostile
environment claim was based on the alleged sexual advances of Stephenson.
Therefore, the failure to exhaust her administrative remedies was fatal. The
Court cited Evans v. Tech Applications and Services
Company, 80 F.3d 954, 963 (4th Cir. 1966) for the proposition that
the complaint may only raise “claims stated in the initial charge, those
reasonably related to that original complaint, and those developed by
reasonable investigation of the original complaint.” The Court found that
the sexual harassment claims against Stephenson were too far removed from
the charges in the Plaintiff's letter to the EEOC regarding the specific
actions of Mr. Casteel as they related to the Plaintiff's pregnancy.
Similarly, Plaintiff was unable to amend her Complaint
to include a retaliation claim as her charge letter did not allege
retaliation. She did not even check a box provided for indicating that
discrimination was based on retaliation. Thus, the Court found that the
Plaintiff had not exhausted her administrative remedies with regard to a
claim of retaliation.
Finally, the Court found that Plaintiff's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim would also be futile. A claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that must be
extreme and outrageous. To be conduct that is extreme and outrageous, it
must go beyond all bounds of decency, be regarded as atrocious and utterly
intolerable in civilized community. Childers v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company, 881 F.2d 1259, 1266 (4th Cir.
1989). The Court noted the allegations in this case are, “sadly, fairly
typical in workplace harassment situations. They do not rise to the level of
outrageousness required to make out an [Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress] claim.” Cuffee at *11.
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