Mr. Hansen was employed by the City as its Chief Building Official. In the spring of 2006, he suffered a heart attack, and was placed on disability. In Nov. 2006, he provided City officials with medical documentation certifying that he was able to return to work, but the City regarded Mr. Hansen as having a permanent disability, and ultimately terminated him on Jan. 2, 2007.

After exhausting administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Mr. Hansen filed suit in Circuit Court. The City responded with a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Hansen had not complied with the LGTCA statutory notice requirements, as codified in Md. Code (1987, 2006 Repl. Vol., 2009 Supp.) section 5-304 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ"). That statute demands notice by the claimant of intent to file a lawsuit within 180 days of the alleged injury. Mr. Hansen had provided notice within the 180 day window, but to the wrong government official. In his opposition to the City's Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Hansen attached a number of exhibits that he had submitted to the City Administrator regarding his discrimination claim. Mr. Hansen argued that his exhibits proved that his notice was satisfactory.

The Court of Special Appeals explored three issues: 1) whether the dismissal was indeed a dismissal or instead a grant of summary judgment; 2) whether Mr. Hansen strictly complied with the notice requirement; and alternatively, 3) whether Mr. Hansen substantially complied with the notice requirement.

First, the Court held that the dismissal was actually a summary judgment, because the Circuit Court had considered the "extrinsic" exhibits Mr. Hansen filed with his opposition. Under Md. Rule 2-322(c), "If, on a motion to dismiss . . . matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment." Because nothing in the record indicated that the Circuit Court excluded the exhibits, the Court of Special Appeals treated the Circuit Court ruling as granting summary judgment to the City. The appellate court also reasoned that summary judgment was appropriate because there were no genuine issues of material fact. The only controversy was a matter of law—whether the City Administrator was the proper recipient of notice under the LGTCA.

Second, the Court held that Mr. Hansen had not strictly complied with the notice requirement. Under section 5-304(c) of the CJ, in Prince George's County, where the City of Laurel is located, notice "shall be given . . . to the county solicitor or county attorney." The Court rejected Mr. Hansen's argument that it would have made more sense to have notified the City Solicitor rather than the County Solicitor when he was suing the City of Laurel. This argument was rejected because Mr. Hansen had never even notified the City Solicitor; he only notified the City Administrator. Because the language of the statute was clear, the Court was bound by its plain text. Providing notice to the City Administrator, as Mr. Hansen had done, was not strictly compliant with the statute's mandate that notice be provided to the County Attorney for Prince George's County.

Next, the Court considered whether Mr. Hansen had substantially complied with the notice requirement. The Court, citing to Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157 (2007), noted that it was well-settled that claimants who failed to strictly comply with CJ section 5-304 notice requirements, may still maintain their lawsuits, so long as they have substantially complied with the notice statute. Substantial compliance will be satisfied when the local government receives actual notice such that it is given an opportunity to investigate properly the potential tort claim. Substantial compliance will be recognized when "the relationship between the person or entity in fact notified and the person or entity that the statute required be notified was so close, with respect to the handling of tort claims, that notice to one effectively constituted notice to the other." Hansen at *14 (quoting Ransom v. Leopold, 183 Md. App. 570, 584 (2008)).

Rather than investigating tort claims, the City Administrator's duties consisted of: budgeting; hiring and firing; directing the City's public works; supervising contracts; as well as other administrative functions. Additionally, the City Administrator had no special professional relationship with either the City or County Solicitor, and nothing in the record suggested that the City Administrator actually notified either the County or City Solicitor of Mr. Hansen's potential tort claim. Therefore, because Mr. Hansen notified the City Administrator, who occupies a position that is not charged with investigating tort claims against the City, rather than the City or County Solicitor, Mr. Hansen did not substantially comply with the notice requirement.

In sum, because Mr. Hansen's claim did not comply with the notice requirements of the LGTCA, as codified in CJ section 5-304(c), his claim against the City based on age and disability discrimination could not survive.