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Counsel Required to Investigate Applicability of Statute Prior to Alleging a Statutory Violation

Cynthia Harkness v. C-Bass Diamond, LLC, Civil Action No.: CCB-08-231 (D. Md. March 16, 2010) available at: http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/Harkness%2016mar10.pdf

Cynthia Harkness ("Harkness"), former General Counsel for Fieldstone Investment Corporation n/k/a C-Bass Diamond, LLC ("C-Bass" or "the company"), filed suit against the company in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ("the Court"), pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A ("the Act"). The Act provides protection against retaliation to "whistleblowing" employees of publicly-traded companies who report potentially unlawful conduct. In her Complaint, Harkness alleged that C-Bass violated the Act by retaliating against her for engaging in activities that are protected under the Act. Specifically, Harkness claimed that C-Bass terminated her employment after she reported that the company's CEO, Michael Sonnenfield ("Sonnefield"), engaged in activities that may have violated Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103.

To state a prima facie claim under the Act, the complaint must alleged that "(1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew, actually or constructively, of the protected activity; (3) the employee suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the circumstances raise an inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action." Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008). C-Bass filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Harkness failed to state a prima facie claim for retaliation under the Act because her reports did not constitute protected activity.

The Court, in granting C-Bass' Motion for Summary Judgment, held that to prove that she engaged in a protected activity, Harkness must demonstrate that she possessed both a subjective and objectively reasonable belief that the conduct about which she complained constituted a violation of relevant law. In other words, Harkness was required to show that she actually believed Sonnenfield's conduct to be a violation of pertinent law and that a reasonable person in her position would believe the same. The Court found that because Harkness took no steps to determine whether Regulation FD applied to Sonnenfield's actions, she had no basis for her belief that his actions violated the regulation. The Court went on to state that Harkness had the experience and resources available to investigate whether Regulation FD applied, and her failure to conduct an investigation prior to reporting Sonnenfield's actions was not objectively reasonable.


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