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Counsel Required to Investigate Applicability of Statute Prior to Alleging a Statutory Violation
(March 2010) By Tamiya N. Wilkes, Associate
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Cynthia Harkness v. C-Bass Diamond, LLC,
Civil Action No.: CCB-08-231 (D. Md. March 16, 2010) available at:
http://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Opinions/Harkness%2016mar10.pdf
Cynthia Harkness ("Harkness"), former General Counsel for
Fieldstone Investment Corporation n/k/a C-Bass Diamond, LLC ("C-Bass" or "the
company"), filed suit against the company in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland ("the Court"), pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A ("the Act"). The Act provides protection against
retaliation to "whistleblowing" employees of publicly-traded companies who
report potentially unlawful conduct. In her Complaint, Harkness alleged that
C-Bass violated the Act by retaliating against her for engaging in activities
that are protected under the Act. Specifically, Harkness claimed that C-Bass
terminated her employment after she reported that the company's CEO, Michael
Sonnenfield ("Sonnefield"), engaged in activities that may have violated
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-243.103.

To state a prima facie claim under the Act, the complaint
must alleged that "(1) the employee engaged in protected activity; (2) the
employer knew, actually or constructively, of the protected activity; (3) the
employee suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the circumstances
raise an inference that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the
personnel action." Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 2008). C-Bass
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that Harkness failed to state a
prima facie claim for retaliation under the Act because her reports did not
constitute protected activity.
The Court, in granting C-Bass' Motion for Summary Judgment,
held that to prove that she engaged in a protected activity, Harkness must
demonstrate that she possessed both a subjective and objectively reasonable
belief that the conduct about which she complained constituted a violation of
relevant law. In other words, Harkness was required to show that she actually
believed Sonnenfield's conduct to be a violation of pertinent law and that a
reasonable person in her position would believe the same. The Court found that
because Harkness took no steps to determine whether Regulation FD applied to
Sonnenfield's actions, she had no basis for her belief that his actions violated
the regulation. The Court went on to state that Harkness had the experience and
resources available to investigate whether Regulation FD applied, and her
failure to conduct an investigation prior to reporting Sonnenfield's actions was
not objectively reasonable.
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