Ms. Benway argued that MD. RULE 2-504(a) sets forth the deadline for filing a summary judgment motion. The Court of Special Appeals, however, found that Ms. Benway's argument misstated the law. First, MD. RULE 2-504(a) does not set forth the deadline for filing a summary judgment motion and does not mandate that a summary judgment motion be filed no later than 5 months from the date that the scheduling order was issued. RULE 2-504(a) merely provides that a Court, unless otherwise ordered by a County Administrative Judge, "shall enter a scheduling order in every civil action." Second, Ms. Benway failed to cite any legal authority in support of her proposition and it is well settled that it is not the court's function to seek out the law in support of a party's contentions. Nonetheless, the Court considered the issue of whether the current version of MD. RULE 2-501 continues to permit a party to file a motion for summary judgment at any time; even though, it does not contain the phrase "file at any time," and its predecessor did.

The Court of Special Appeals discussed the October 11, 2002 meeting of the Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, wherein the Committee discussed the language of MD. RULE 2-501 permitting a party to file a motion for summary judgment at "any time." In particular, one Committee member expressed concern with a party's ability to file such a motion at any time even when the scheduling order sets forth a deadline. In response, a motion was made to remove the language "at any time" from RULE 2-501(a), in order to clarify that the scheduling order is paramount. The motion was passed unanimously. The Court of Appeals adopted the proposed change by the Rules Committee but substituted the word "make" for the word "file," thus clarifying that a party need not file a paper motion. Notably, pertinent to the instant appeal, the Court of Appeals added a committee note which stated "for an example of a summary judgment granted at trial, see Beyer v. Morgan State," 396 Md. 335 (2002). The addition of the citation to Beyer created some confusion in the courts.

In 2007, however, the Court of Appeals was presented with the opportunity to clarify the apparent incongruity in the rules in Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400 Md. 39 (2007). The Court of Appeals clearly iterated that a motion for summary judgment may be filed at any time, regardless of the provisions of RULES 2-501 or 2-504. Despite the fact that the Court did not mention the amendments to RULE 2-501, which removed the term "at any time" from the RULE, the Court of Appeals specifically held that, under the current version of RULE 2-501, a party may make a motion for summary judgment "at any time during the proceeding."

The Court of Special Appeals found that Rodriguez v. Clarke was directly on point with the instant issue. Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals found that the Circuit Court did not err in considering the motion for summary judgment, even though it was filed after the deadline in the scheduling order. Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals noted that, despite the fact that there was a scheduling order deadline, it would be against the interests of judicial economy for a party to be forced to move forward with trial after determining that there are no genuine facts in dispute, and he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, merely because the dispositive motion deadline has passed.