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Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Failing to Consider Relevant Factors Prior to Denying Motion to Vacate
(January 2010) By Tamiya N. Wilkes, Associate
For more information, contact Paul Farquharson.
Jaime Carrasco v. Thomas D. Walsh,
No. 09-CV-288 (D.C. January 28, 2010)
http://www.dcappeals.gov/dccourts/appeals/pdf/09-cv-288_mtd.pdf
Thomas D. Walsh ("Walsh"), landlord, filed suit against his
tenant, Jaime Carrasco ("Carrasco") for possession of the rental premises, in
the D.C. Superior Court (the "trial court"). Walsh alleged that Carrasco failed
to pay rent for the period of September 1, 2007 through October 31, 2007.
Carrasco did not appear in the trial court for the proceedings; therefore, the
trial court entered a default judgment for possession against him. Carrasco
claims that he did not learn that a judgment for possession had been entered
against him until he was actually evicted from the premises.
One year after the eviction, Carrasco filed a Motion to
Vacate the default judgment, pursuant to SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 60(b).1 Carrasco
argued that he never received actual notice of the proceedings, despite the
affidavit of service, filed with the Court, indicating that the process server
attempted personal service of the summons and complaint on two occasions without
success and then effected service by posting and first class mail. Carrasco also
argued that he would have paid all monies due to the landlord prior to the
eviction, had he received notice from the trial court regarding the eviction.
The trial court denied Carrasco’s Motion to Vacate; he appealed the matter to
the D.C. Court of Appeals (the "Court of Appeals").
In Starling v. Jephunneh Lawrence &Assocs., 495 A.2d 1157,
1159-60 (D.C. 1985), the Court of Appeals found that the following five relevant
factors should be considered in evaluating whether to grant a motion to vacate:
(1) whether the movant had actual notice of the proceedings; (2) whether the
movant acted in good faith; (3) whether the movant presented a prima facie
adequate defense; (4) whether the movant acted promptly in seeking relief; and
(5) the potential prejudice to the non-moving party from granting the motion. In
the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to consider five relevant factors.
The Court of Appeals held that if the trial court was not
prepared to accept the truth of Carrasco’s claims, it should have afforded him
the chance to prove them in an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals further
held that the trial court should have considered the cause and consequences of
Carrasco’s delay in moving to vacate: the eviction caused Mr. Carrasco to be
homeless and he was unable to obtain legal assistance for a year. Additionally,
there was no evidence of prejudice identified in the trial court record;
therefore, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of Carrasco’s
Motion to Vacate.
1 The purpose of Carrasco’s Motion to Vacate was not to
regain possession of the rental premises, but to overturn the judgment so that
he would not be precluded on res judicata grounds from pursuing a claim against
Walsh for wrongful eviction.
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