Mr. Baba filed a civil lawsuit in the District of Columbia Superior Court, alleging that he had been assaulted and battered by Mr. Goldstein. Upon filing the Complaint, under R. 4 (m), Mr. Baba had sixty days to serve Mr. Goldstein and to file proof of service of process with the Court. When Mr. Baba failed to effect service of process on Mr. Goldstein by the deadline, Judge Beck dismissed the case without prejudice. In her Order, Judge Beck advised that Mr. Baba could file a Motion to Vacate upon a showing of good cause. Mr. Baba timely filed the Motion to Vacate, and along with it, submitted an affidavit from the process server, detailing diligent, unsuccessful attempts to serve Mr. Goldstein. In his Motion to Vacate, Mr. Baba also argued that he would suffer prejudice if the dismissal were not vacated. Any dismissal without prejudice, would effectively operate as a dismissal with prejudice, as the statute of limitations for filing suit had since expired. Judge Beck vacated the dismissal, and Mr. Baba ultimately served Mr. Goldstein.

Shortly thereafter, because of the Court's calendar shift, Mr. Baba's case was re-assigned from Judge Beck to Judge Long. Mr. Goldstein filed a Motion to Dismiss, essentially asking Judge Long to reconsider Judge Beck's prior ruling. Judge Long granted Mr. Goldstein's Motion to Dismiss, and because the statute of limitations had run, the dismissal was with prejudice.

The Court of Appeals focused on Judge Long's Order because on appeal, the "proper inquiry is whether the second trial judge's ultimate disposition was correct." Baba at *5 (quoting Carter-Obayuwana v. Howard Univ., 764 A.2d 779, 792 n.22 (D.C. 2001)). The Court applied an abuse of discretion standard of review. The Court of Appeals noted that in her decision, Judge Long focused exclusively on the timeliness of Mr. Baba's service under R. 4 (m), rather than considering, in the broader sense, whether Mr. Baba satisfied R. 41 (b), requiring plaintiff to show "good cause" why the case should not be dismissed. R. 41 (b) requires a "more complete assessment of the parties' circumstances and the good-faith attempts of the plaintiff to comply with the rules." Baba at *7.

Trial courts should weigh a number of factors in exercising discretion under R. 41 (b) with respect to a R. 4 (m) violation. The first, and most important factor, is plaintiff's failure to comply with the rule. The second factor is the prejudice to the plaintiff from having the complaint dismissed, balanced against the prejudice to the defendant from having the case continue. The third factor is whether the plaintiff has made a showing of reasonable diligence in attempting to comply with the rules. Other factors include whether the plaintiff has outlined a plan for future service of process and difficulties encountered in serving a recalcitrant defendant.

Judge Long abused her discretion by failing to consider the second factor, prejudice, altogether. The Appellate Court noted that the balance of prejudices weighed "heavily" in Mr. Baba's favor. "Contrary to the extreme prejudice that will result to [Mr.] Baba if the complaint is dismissed, it appears that [Mr.] Goldstein will not suffer any prejudice; he was . . . served . . . and had actual notice of the action against him shortly after it had commenced." Baba at *9-10. The trial court erred by failing to give all the relevant factors consideration, and instead exclusively focused on Mr. Baba's noncompliance with R. 4 (m). Because the Superior Court "excessively narrowed its analysis" and failed to take into account the good cause factors, it abused its discretion. Baba at *10. As such, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the Superior Court to reconsider the dismissal.