Findings of Facts
Ms. Snowden retained Mr. Rand to represent her in a divorce
action against her husband, Martin Allen Snowden ("Mr. Snowden"). Both parties
sought alimony, spousal support, and child support. Mr. Rand sought production
of Mr. Snowden's medical health treatment records from various providers,
including the Priory Hospital in London, England. Mr. Snowden's attorney opposed
the request and the Circuit Court ultimately ordered that "Counsel shall draft a
Confidentiality Agreement to limit dissemination of records only to Counsel and
experts scheduled to testify on issues of alimony and need for support."
The Confidentiality Agreement ("Agreement") detailed Mr.
Rand's obligations with respect to Mr. Snowden's mental health records at the
conclusion of the divorce litigation. One of those obligations was that he was
to maintain only one copy of the records at the conclusion of litigation and
return to Mr. Snowden's counsel all other copies in his possession or in any
person's possession to whom he gave the documents. The Agreement was signed by
all parties, and Mr. Rand received a copy of Mr. Snowden's records from Priory
Hospital.
On December 19, 2006, the Circuit Court granted a Judgment
of Absolute Divorce to Mr. and Mrs. Snowden. Thereafter, Mr. Rand believed
unresolved issues remained because Mr. Snowden had not allowed Ms. Snowden to
purchase his interest in the marital home as provided for in the Judgment of
Absolute Divorce. A series of motions filed by each party and unanswered letters
from Mr. Snowden's counsel to Mr. Rand requesting return of the medical records
ensued. Finally, after months of Mr. Snowden's attorney requesting the return of
the medical records, Mr. Rand responded on November 13, 2007 by returning the
records and stating that he did not believe that the matter had reached
finality. Specifically, Mr. Rand believed that child support remained an open
issue.
Judge McCormick found, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Mr. and Mrs. Snowden resolved all outstanding issues in their divorce
action on December 19, 2006 when the Circuit Court entered the Judgment of
Absolute Divorce. She further found that Mr. Snowden's medical records were only
made available for review in connection with issues of alimony and spousal
support and not for use in connection with any outstanding child support
dispute. Finally, Judge McCormick found that there was clear and convincing
evidence that Mr. Rand's primary motive for retaining the medical records was to
have the records available for review and use as evidence in connection with his
separate representation of Ms. Snowden in a related case. This, she found,
violated the terms of the Agreement.
Conclusions of Law
Despite her findings of fact, Judge McCormick concluded that
Mr. Rand did not violate MRPC 4.4 (a) by attempting to "use a method of
obtaining evidence that the lawyer knows violates the legal rights of another
person." She did, however, find that Mr. Rand engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice in violation of MRPC 8.4 (d) by retaining the
medical records beyond the authorized time stated in the Agreement and by
failing to respond to repeated requests from Mr. Snowden's attorney for the
return of Mr. Snowden's records.
Analysis by Court of Appeals
Based upon a de novo review, the Court of Appeals concluded
that Mr. Rand did not violate MRPC 8.4 (d). Although the Court stated that it
did not condone Mr. Rand's conduct, it was not prepared to declare, on the
record, that this incident was sanctionable conduct under MRPC 8.4 (d).
The Court concluded that Mr. Rand's conduct did not rise to
the level of the misconduct found in other cases where violations of MRPC 8.4
(d) were found. There was no evidence showing that Mr. Rand's delay in
responding to opposing counsel's letters on returning the medical records late
resulted in anything approaching prejudice to the administration of justice. A
delay alone will unlikely be sufficient to show prejudice, absent any actual and
substantial harm flowing from the delay. Although Mr. Rand's conduct was
discourteous, misguided, contrary to the Agreement, and in the course of
representing his client, it was not sanctionable behavior under MRPC 8.4 (d)
because it did not reach the degree where it became prejudicial to the
administration of justice. His actions did not delay proceedings, involve
deceit, result in any prejudice to Mr. Snowden, or apparently result in
substantially increased fees to the litigants involved. The proper corrective
motion, which did happen in the case, was for Mr. Snowden's counsel to file a
motion and to let the Court decide whether his retention of the records was
proper.