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District of Columbia Voters Lack Standing to Demand Board of Elections Review of an Office of Campaign Finance Decision

David J. Mallof, et al. v. District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics,, Appeal No. 09-AA-182 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, August 5, 2010) | View pdf

In this D.C. Court of Appeals opinion, the Court addressed an issue of first impression in the District of Columbia. The Court affirmed the D.C. Board of Elections decision that individual District of Columbia residents/voters did not have standing to request that the Board of Elections review an initial determination made by the Office of Campaign Finance. The Board held that the voters were not adversely affected by the Office of Campaign Finance's decision, and the Court of Appeals agreed.

During a 2008 political campaign, Jack Evans, the incumbent councilmember for D.C.'s Ward 2, placed a full page advertisement featuring a photograph of him with D.C. Metropolitan Police Chief Cathy Lanier. The photograph was taken in the councilmember's office. Section 1-1106.51 (a) of the District of Columbia campaign finance laws prohibits the use of District government resources for campaign-related activities. Certain voters living in Ward 2, led by David Mallof contended that Mr. Evans' use of his office and the Police Chief violated the law, and they filed a complaint with the Office of Campaign Finance (OCF). OCF performed an investigation and determined that Mr. Evans did not violate the campaign finance law. The voters sought review of the decision from the D.C. Board of Elections and Ethics.

The Board of Elections determined that a review of the OCF decision was not warranted on the basis that the Petitioners lacked standing to obtain Board review. The Board stated that based on their status as voters, these individuals were not adversely affected or aggrieved by the Board's decision. In other words, these voters had suffered no injury-in-fact, and therefore had no basis for obtaining review of the underlying decision. The voters appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Court first affirmed the Board of Elections decision to use the injury in fact test to determine standing. The voters contended that since they were seeking Board review of an OCF decision, as opposed to Judicial review of an agency decision, the injury in fact standard was inappropriate. The Court responded: "We must defer to the Board's interpretation of the regulation it has promulgated unless its interpretation is plainly wrong or inconsistent with the governing statute." Mallof v. D.C. Board of Elections, at *14.

The Court then went on to consider the substantive issue. That is, whether the D.C. voters in Ward 2 had standing to seek Board review of an OCF decision with which they disagreed. The Court cited Supreme Court precedent for the constitutional minimum requirements for standing: "The plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact' – an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).

Under this standard, the Court reviewed the voters two separate basis for contending they had standing: (1) that the decision diminished their ability to have an outcome on the election, and (2) that OCF's decision would set a precedent allowing future candidates to violate the law. The Court noted that this was a case of first impression in D.C., and while an opposing candidate may have standing to seek Board of Election review, individual voters do not.

The Court cited numerous Federal Appellate cases that voters do not have standing to challenge campaign finance laws. In Gottlieb v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 330 U.S. App. D.C. 104, 143 F.3d 618 (1998), President Clinton's campaign was targeted in a complaint to the Federal Election Commission based upon alleged campaign finance law violations. The Appellate Court stated that the argument--that any violation injured the voters' rights to influence the political process--"rest[ed] on gross speculation" and was "far too fanciful to merit treatment as an injury in fact." Id. at 107.

The Court noted that while no two cases are the same, the Federal Court precedent supported the finding that individual voters do not possess standing in situations such as this.


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