Michael Williams was the Associate Director of Athletic
Programs for the District of Columbia's Department of Parks and Recreation
("DPR"). In this role, he administered DPR's youth recreational basketball
leagues. The basketball program included both a "pee wee" division for children
between the ages of six and eight, and a "pony" division for children ages nine
and ten. Importantly, the cut-off date for separating between the two divisions
was April 5, 2009, that is, children who would turn nine before April 5, 2009
were to play in the "pony" division with the older children, as opposed to the
"pee wee" division.
In February of 2009, Michael Williams began receiving
complaints that twin sons of District of Columbia Mayor Adrian Fenty, were
improperly playing in the "pee wee" division as their ninth birthday would
occur on March 8, 2009. Michael Williams brought this information to the
attention of Clark Ray, the head of DPR. Mr. Ray looked into the issue and
informed Mr. Williams that the Mayor's sons would remain in the pee wee
division. Michael Williams then had an associate in his office contact Mayor
Fenty directly by telephone regarding the issue.
Several days later, Michael Williams was informed by
Mr. Ray that he was being terminated for budgetary reasons. Mr. Williams
then testified before the District of Columbia Council regarding the
basketball league issue with the Mayor's sons and his subsequent
termination. In his lawsuit, he alleged that District of Columbia government
employees further retaliated against him by making defamatory statements
about him, specifically that he was terminated for embezzlement.
Mr. Williams filed suit against the District of
Columbia alleging a violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code
§ 1-615.51 (2001). Like most whistleblower protection laws, the D.C. statute
is intended to provide protection to government employees who step forward
to report waste, fraud, abuse of authority, or violation of laws.
Specifically, the act prohibits a supervisor from taking a "prohibited
personnel action," including terminating an employee, in retaliation for
that employee's having made a "protected disclosure." D.C. Code §§ 1-615.52,
53 (2001). Mr. Williams' suit also made a claim of defamation based on the
rumors that he was terminated for embezzling government funds.
The trial court granted the District of Columbia's
Motion to Dismiss all claims, and Michael Williams appealed. As to the
Whistleblower Protection Act claim, the trial court found that the
information about Mayor Fenty's sons playing in the younger league was in
the public domain, and therefore not a protected disclosure under the
statute. The Court declined to adopt this broad view that an employee is not
entitled to the Act's protections when appropriate, simply because someone
in the public may already know the information. However, the Court noted
that in this particular situation, the information about Mayor Fenty's sons
and the basketball league was not just known by some in the public, but had
been vocalized by multiple people and become a matter of public discourse.
The Court stated, "We do not doubt that Williams's
'disclosure' was commendable and well-intentioned, but he did not bring
himself within the protection of the DC-WPA and was "not serving [its
particular] purpose . . . by disclosing what [was] already known." Williams,
at *8-9.
The Court went on to address the trial court's
dismissal of Mr. Williams' defamation claim. To state a claim of defamation
a plaintiff must show: "(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory
statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the
statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault
in publishing the statement amounted to at least negligence; and (4) either
that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special
harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm."
Beeton v. District of Columbia, 779 A.2d 918,
923 (D.C. 2001). The Court held that taking all well-pleaded facts as true,
Mr. Williams' claim for defamation was sufficient to survive a Motion to
Dismiss on the pleadings.